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INTRODUCTION

n order for the legal system to be effective, the public must believe that
the system works. Public faith in the judiciary is secured in an
appearance of impartiality in which reasoned interpretation of the law
rather than a judge's personal view is controlling.' Judicial campaign
speech threatens this appearance of impartiality, thus threatening the
public's faith in the judiciary. When candidates express opinions on
disputed issues during the campaign, this expression is designed to get
votes by implying that judges decide issues according to their own views.2
The problem with such judicial campaign speech is best summarized by a
recently elected judge,
attacking courts and judges -- not because they are wrong
on the law or the facts of a case, but because the decision is
considered wrong simply as a matter of political judgment
-- maligns one of the basic tenets of judicial independence
-- intellectual honesty and dedication to enforcement of the
rule of law regardless of popular sentiment. Dedication to
the rule of law requires judges to rise above the political
moment in making judicial decisions. What is so troubling
about criticism of court rulings and individual judges based

1.
J. Scott Gary, Ethical Conduct in a Judicial Campaign: Is Campaigning an
EthicalActivity?, 57 WASH. L. REV. 119, 136 (1981).
2.
Id. at 137.
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solely on political disagreement with the outcome is that it
evidences a fundamentally misguided belief that the
judicial branch should operate and be treated just like
another constituency-driven political arm of government.
Judges should not have "political constituencies." Rather,
of the rule of law
a judge's fidelity must be to enforcement
3
regardless of perceived popular will.
In order for the judiciary to remain a viable and trusted institution, the
public must believe that when a person has a conflict, an unbiased
resolution can be had in the courts. If the public believes, whether justified
or not, that judges are beholden to a political party, interest group,
campaign contributor, particular viewpoint, etcetera, then self-help
becomes a better option than the judiciary. The preservation and
legitimacy of the judiciary "deserve priority over the ambitions of
individual candidates."4 At one time, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized
this fact stating, "[t]he legitimacy of the Judicial Branch ultimately depends
on its reputation for impartiality and nonpartisanship.",5 It appears, though,
that the legitimacy of the judiciary might not be as important to five
members of the U.S. Supreme Court as it once was.
In the Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, a five-to-four majority
struck down a judicial campaign speech restriction designed to uphold the
impartiality and integrity of the judiciary and left remaining restrictions in
serious doubt.6 The purpose of this paper is to examine judicial campaign
speech restrictions and explore what states with elected judiciaries can do,
in light of White, to maintain the impartiality and integrity of their
judiciaries. Part II examines the history of judicial campaign speech
restrictions, how they came about and how they changed. Part HI looks at
how the different state and federal courts dealt with alleged judicial
campaign speech violations before White and the tension between the
state's compelling state interest and the candidate's First Amendment
rights. Part IV describes and analyzes the White decision. Part V discusses
immediate reactions to the White decision including the recently decided

Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 802 (2002) (Stevens, J.,
3.
dissenting) (quoting Paul J. De Muniz, Politicizing State Judicial Elections: A Threat to
Judicial Independence, 38 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 367, 387 (2002)).
4. Gary, supra note I, at 137.
5.
White, 536 U.S. at 802 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 407 (1989)).
6.
White, 536 U.S. 765.
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Weaver v. Bonner case.7 Finally, Part VI explores a possible alternative in
dealing with judicial campaign speech, the unofficial campaign conduct
committee.

U1.

HISTORY OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN SPEECH

When examining judicial campaign speech, it is appropriate to
examine how the speech came to be. Since the inception of the United
States, the selection of judges has been an issue.8 While judicial
appointment by either the executive or legislative branch was the norm
from the beginning of the United States until the early Nineteenth Century, 9
elections of judges quickly became popular.'l The transmutation from
appointments to popular election occurred substantially during the "Age of
Jackson."' Scholars have disagreed on the reason for the change and have12
attributed the selection transformation to reasons including: "mobocracy,"'
an "unthinking 'emotional response' rooted in the 'resistless demand' of
Jacksonian Democracy,"' 13 "political expediency," 14 and a "thoughtful
response by constitutional moderates in the legal profession to ensure that
15
state judges would command more rather than less power and prestige."'
Whatever the reason for the switch to an elected judiciary, it is clear that

7.
Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312 (11 th Cir. 2002) (hereinafter Weaver 11).
8.
In the Declaration of Independence, the colonists listed as one of the grievances
against King George III the problem with the King's selection and control of the judiciary,
"[The King] has made Judges dependent on his Will alone for the Tenure of their Offices,

and the Amount and Payment of their salaries." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para.
II (U.S. 1776).
9.
Kelley Armitage, Denial Ain't Just a River in Egypt: A Thorough Review of
Judicial Elections, Merit Selection and the Role of State Judges in Society, 29 CAP. U. L.
REV. 625, 629 (2002) (citing Jona Goldschmidt, Merit Selection: Current Status,
Procedures,and Issues, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 4 (1994)).
10.
Id. See also Kermit L. Hall, The Judiciaryon Trial: State ConstitutionalReform
and the Rise of an Elected Judiciary, 1846-1860, 45 THE HISTORIAN 337 (1983). In 1812,

Georgia chose to elect judges. Twenty years later Mississippi adopted a constitution that
gave the power of selecting judges to the voters. Between 1846 and 1860 nineteen of
twenty-one constitutional conventions approved popular election of judges. Id.

1I.
James Alfini & Jarrett Gable, The Role of the Organized Bar in State Judicial
Selection Reform: The Year 2000 Standards, 106 DICK. L. REV. 683, 685 (2002).

12.

Armitage, supra note 9, at 630.

14.
15.

Id. at 339.
Id. at 354.

13.
Kermit L. Hall, The Judiciary on Trial: State Constitutional Reform and the
Rise of an Elected Judiciary,1846-1860, 46 THE HISTORIAN 337, 338 (1983).
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the "Age of Jackson" heralded the beginning of electing judges, and thus,
the beginning of judicial campaign speech.
While malcontent with judicial elections beginning in the Progressive
16
Era caused some states to try alternative methods of judicial selection,
(for example the Kales17 plan, also known as the Missouri or merit plan, 8)
currently, most states retain some type of popular election as a method of
selecting some or all of their judges.' 9 With the advent of electing judges
inevitably came judicial campaign speech. The legal profession recognized
early in the twentieth century that judicial campaign speech threatened the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary 2° and some guidance was
necessary for the judiciary's preservation. The American Bar Association
(ABA) was the first legal organization to recommend ethical standards for
judicial candidates and the states tended to adopt the ABA's model codes
in part or whole. The ABA and states' ethics codes for judicial candidates
"attempt to reconcile the perceived need for an elected judiciary with the
general desire2 for a judiciary of unquestioned integrity, independence, and
impartiality." 1
A.

THE

1924

ABA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS

In 1908 the American Bar Association (ABA) approved the Canons of
Professional Ethics, but these Canons contained no separate rules for
judges.22 While resolutions calling for Judicial Canons were presented at
the ABA's 1909 and 1917 conventions, no actions were taken.23 Reasons

16.

Luke Bierman, Beyond Merit Selection, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 851, 854

(2002).
17.
Alfini & Gable, supra note 11, at 689.
18.
Armitage, supra note 9, at 633. This plan calls for a commission to nominate
candidates for the judgeship and the governor would select the appointee from the list. The
appointee would then stand for retention after a certain time period. Id. at 632-33.
19.
Seven states have no judicial elections: Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Virginia. All of the other 43 states have
some form of election or retention selection for some or all of their judges.

20.
Eileen Libby, Judging What Candidates Can Say: Supreme Court to Tackle
Judicial Campaign Speeches, 1. No. 4 A.B.A. J.E. REP. 9 (2002). "In a speech before the

Cincinnati Bar Association, William Howard Taft said it was 'disgraceful' to see men
campaigning for the state supreme court on the grounds that their decisions would have a
particular class flavor. Taft said the practice ought to be condemned." Id.

21.
James J. Alfini & Terrence J. Brooks, Ethical Constraintson Judicial Election
Campaigns:A Review and Critique of Canon 7, 77 Ky. L. J. 671, 672 (1989).
22.
Robert B. McKay, The Judiciary and Nonjudicial Activities, 35 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 14 (1970).
23.
Id. at 15 (citing AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, REPORT No. 8 (June 1969)).
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for this lack of action vary: "Many felt such canons were unnecessary; that
the real issue was judicial competency rather than honesty. Others believed
it was not the proper role of the Bar to impose standards on the judiciary,
feeling that such canons would more appropriately be developed within the
judiciary. 24 It was not until Federal District Court Judge Kennesaw
Landis "supplement[ed] his $7,500 federal salary with $42,500 a year for
legal services rendered as a national commissioner of the baseball
associations" that the ABA was prodded to act because the only sanction at
the ABA's disposal was a "resolution of censure. 2 5
A Committee on Judicial Ethics was appointed in January 192226
amidst advocacy for creating ethical standards for the judiciary. 27 In 1923,
a draft of canons of judicial ethics was published in order to receive
criticisms and suggestions and then a redraft incorporating the suggestions
was submitted for approval by the Bar.28 In 1924 the ABA approved the
Canons of Judicial Ethics which, for the first time, endeavored to regulate
judicial candidates' campaign speech.2 9 The Canons were developed by an
ABA Committee on Judicial Ethics chaired by Chief Justice William
Howard Taft, 30 and according to Justice Taft were intended to be a "guide
and reminder to the judiciary.'
Many states, however, adopted this
"guide" as substantive rules, which gave the Canons in those states the
force of law as well the added persuasion of sanctions for violations. 32

See also Am. Bar Ass'n, Summary of Report of the Committee on Professional Ethics, 42

REP. OF THE A.B.A., 363-364 (1917) (mentioning that the committee "dealt with the subject
of certain tentative canons for the judiciary, which were recommended to the Judiciary
Section of the Association for consideration.").
24.
Id.
25.

Id.

See also Am. Bar Ass'n, Landis Resolution, 46 REP. OF THE A.B.A., 61-67

(1921) (discussing and censuring Kenesaw Landis).
26.
Am. Bar Ass'n, Special Committee on Judicial Ethics, Final Report and
Proposed Canons of JudicialEthics, 9 A.B.A. J. 449, 449 (1923).
27.
Hon. Russell Benedict, CertainSuggestions as to Standards of Propriety Which
Should Govern the Personal and Official Conduct of Judges, Address before the annual

meeting of the New York State Bar Association (Jan. 21, 1922), in 8 A.B.A. J. 199, 200
(1922) (suggesting that "personal and official conduct of judges be governed by recognized
and settled standards of propriety.").
28.

Am. Bar Ass'n, Final Report of the Committee on Judicial Ethics, 48 REP. OF

THE A.B.A., 452-60 (1923).

29.
ABA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS (1924).
30.
Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty in Judicial
Ethics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1059, 1063 (1996).
31.
Id. at 1065 n. 26 (quoting Final Report and Proposed Canons of Judicial

Ethics, 9 A.B.A. J.449,449 (1923)).
32.
Shepard, supra note 30, at 1065 (citing Robert Martineau, Enforcement of the
Code of JudicialConduct, 1972 UTAH L. REV. 410, 410 (1972)).
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One of the public's concerns33 that the Canons endeavored to address
was how to deal with campaign speech. While several Canons regulated
judicial candidates' campaign and political activities,34 Canon 30 explicitly
restricted campaign speech:
A candidate for judicial position should not make or suffer
others to make for him, promises of conduct in office
which appeal to the cupidity or prejudices of the
appointing or electing power; he should not announce in
advance his conclusions of law on disputed issues to secure
class support, and he should do nothing while a candidate
to create the impression that if chosen, he will administer
35
his office with bias, partiality or improper discrimination.
Canon 30 was the judicial candidates' guide to what could or could
not be said during elections for forty-eight years.
Canon 28 also restricted candidates' campaign speech by requiring
that "a judge avoid making political speeches, contributing or soliciting
payments for party funds, publicly endorsing candidates for political office,
and participating in party conventions. 36 Two amendments further honed
Canon 28's application. In 1933 an amendment "prohibited a judge from
generally engaging in partisan activities and, more specifically, from
serving as a party committee member or party leader," and a 1950
amendment created an exception which "permit[ted] a judge subject to
partisan election to attend and speak at political gatherings and to
contribute to the campaign fund of the party supporting the judge's
candidacy. 37 Both Canon 30 and Canon 28 recognized a need for
restrictions on judicial campaign speech.

33.

E.g., Press Comments on Proposed Code of Judicial Ethics, 9 A.B.A. J. 191,

191 (1923).
Most of the rules laid down by the committee prescribe or forbid
conduct that is on its face so manifestly proper or improper that it is
surprising that there should be any need to say anything about it. Yet it
is well that there should be condemnation of the making of promises by
elective judges during a campaign in return for support. (emphasis

added)

Id. (quoting the Indianapolis News).
34.
JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS 356 (3d ed. 2001).
35.
ABA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS, Canon 30 (1924). A portion of Canon 30

was amended in 1933, but the relevant language cited above was not changed.
36.
37.

LISA MILORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE 45 (1992).

Id.
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1972 ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

In 1969, the ABA realized the 1924 Canons were out of date.38
Events pointing to their inadequacy included "controversies over the
activities of Justices Fortas and Douglas, and in the inquiries into the
qualifications of Judge Haynesworth for appointment to the Supreme
39
Recognizing the need to preserve the integrity and independence
Court.,
of the judiciary, the ABA revised the 1924 Canons of Judicial Ethics by
creating the 1972 Code of Judicial Conduct, which was meant to be a
model for states to adopt 4° and enforce in each jurisdiction. 4 1 To do this,
the Special Committee on Standards of Judicial Conduct rejected both the
style and form of the 1924 Canons, but tried to keep the substance of the
old Canons.42 As with the 1924 Canons, the issue of judicial campaign
speech was again at the forefront.4 3
The substance of Canons 28 and 30 was found in Canon 7 of the 1972
Code. 44 Canon 7 attempted to describe the "general minimum ethical
standard" under which judicial political activity should be conducted.45
Recognizing that "ethical standards of impartiality and the appearance of
impartiality are basically incompatible with the practical political
necessities involved in being elected to judicial office," the ABA
Committee attempted to "not only ... set ethical minimums, but also to
upgrade the campaigns for elective judicial offices. 46 More specifically,
In regulating
Canon 7B addressed campaign speech restrictions.

Amy M. Craig, The Burial of an Impartial Judicial System: The Lifting of
38.
Restrictions on Judicial Candidate Speech in North Carolina, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV.

413,417 (1998).
Whitney North Seymour, The Code of Judicial Conduct from the Point of View
39.

of a Member of the Bar, 1972 UTAH L. REV. 352, 352 (1972).
Matthew J. O'Hara, Note, Restriction of Judicial Election Candidates' Free
40.
Speech Rights After Buckley: A Compelling Constitutional Limitation?, 70 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 197, 211 (1994).

41.

Robert J. Martineau, Enforcement of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 1972 UTAH

L. REV. 410, 412 (1972).
Donald T. Weckstein, Introductory Observations on the Code of Judicial
42.
Conduct, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 785, 795 (1972).
Am. Bar Ass'n, Report of the Special Committee on Standards of Judicial
43.
Conduct, 96 REP. OF THE A.B.A., 733-34 (1971) (discussing how a judge "may engage in
activities for improvement of justice providing he does not take a position that would affect

his impartiality on matter that might come before him.") (emphasis added).
44.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7 (1972) [hereinafter 1972 MODEL
CODE].

45.
46.
47.

Weckstein, supra note 42, at 797.

Id.

1972 MODEL CODE, supra note 44, Canon 7.
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campaign speech, Canon 7B(1)(a) required that all judicial candidates
"maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office,, 48 but did not explicitly
state the asserted goals of the ABA, the preservation of the judiciary's
"integrity" or "impartiality," leaving those requirements in Canons 1 and 2
which apply only to sitting judges.49
Canon 7 is divided into part A, which discusses "political conduct in
general" and part B, which regulates specifically "campaign conduct."50
The relevant campaign speech provision is located in Canon 7B(1)(c),
which states:
A candidate, including an incumbent judge. . . (c) should
not make pledges or promises of conduct in office other
than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of
the office; announce his views on disputed legal or
political issues; or misrepresent
his identity, qualifications,
51
present position, or other fact.
According to E. Wayne Thode's Reporter'sNotes for the 1972 Code,
the reason for this tighter version of Canons 28 and 30 was that "[t]he
Committee was . . . of the opinion that a candidate should not base his
campaign on his view of the solutions to disputed political issues. He can
campaign on the basis of his ability, experience, and record., 52 This
statement highlights the conflict between the role of the judiciary and the
politicized election process that Canon 7B was meant to address.53
One notable addition in Canon 7 that was not in Canon 30 or Canon
28 of the 1924 Canons in any form is the provision forbidding candidates
from making misrepresentations.54 This section was added because of
"instances of misrepresentation made known to the Committee." 55 Other
than the addition of the misrepresent provision, the spirit of Canons 30 and
28 remained embodied in Canon 7 in a firmer form.

48.
49.

1972 MODEL CODE, supra note 44, Canon 7B(1)(a).

PATRICK M. MCFADDEN, STUDIES OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM, ELECTING JUSTICE:

THE LAW AND ETHiCS OF JUDICIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 78-79
50.
1972 MODEL CODE, supra note 44, Canon 7.

51.
Id. Canon 7B(l)(c).
52.
E. WAYNE THODE, REPORTER'S
(A.B.A. 1973).
53.
Id.
54.
MILORD, supra note 36, at 46.
55.
THODE, supra note 52, at 98.

(1990).

NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

98
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1990 ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

Following a 1986 survey in the field of judicial ethics by the ABA
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility 56 and
several court attacks on Canon 7's constitutionality,5 7 the ABA developed
the 1990 Code of Judicial Conduct.58 According to Justice Randall
Shepard, the 1990 Code "tighten[ed] up the hortatory language which had
dominated the 1972 version.' 59 Most notably, the 1990 version used
language such as "shall" and "must" when speaking of mandatory
standards and "should" and "may" when addressing aspirational
standards. 60 As for the campaign speech restrictions, Canon 5A(3)(d)
encompassed the principles embodied in Canon 7B(1)(c) of the 1972 Code
and Canons 30 and 28 of the 1924 Canons.
Canon 5A(3)(d) altered significantly Canon 7B(1)(c) in two ways: it
erased the prohibition on a candidate's announcing of his views and
inserted a knowing requirement for the misrepresent provision. 6 1 Canon
5A(3)(d) reads:
A candidate for judicial office . . . shall not (i) make
pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the
faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the
office; (ii) make statements that commit or appear to
commit the candidate with respect to cases, controversies
or issues that are likely to come before the court; or (iii)
knowingly misrepresent the identity, qualifications, present
position or other fact concerning the candidate or an
opponent.6 2
The 1990 Code also included extensive Commentary following
Section 5A(3)(d) which added explanations for the section including the
explanation that the Section "does not prohibit a candidate from making
pledges or promises respecting improvements in court administration. 63

56.

Id. See also Am. Bar Ass'n, Report No. 1 of the Standing Committee on Ethics

and ProfessionalResponsibility, 115 REP. OF THE A.B.A., 72-85 (1990).

57.

Craig, supra note 38, at 418.

58.

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1990) [hereinafter 1990 MODEL CODE].

60.
61.
62.

MILORD, supra note 36, at 8.
Id.at 50.
1990 MODEL CODE, supra note 58, Canon 5A(3)(d).

59.

63.

Shepard, supra note 30, at 1066.

Id. Canon 5A(3)(d) Commentary.
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To explain the changes and why the ABA believed updating the model was
essential, the ABA added a Preamble in the 1990 Code, which helped
explain the necessity of campaign speech restrictions:
Our legal system is based on the principle that an
independent, fair and competent judiciary will interpret and
apply the laws that govern us. The role of the judiciary is
central to American concepts of justice and the rule of law.
Intrinsic to all sections of this Code are the precepts that
judges, individually and collectively, must respect and
honor the judicial office as a public trust and strive to
enhance and maintain confidence in our legal system. The
judge is an arbiter of facts and law for the resolution of
disputes and a 64
highly visible symbol of government under
the rule of law.

D.

THE CURRENT STATE OF THE MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

Since 1990, the ABA has not added or modified any campaign speech
restrictions in its Model Code. However, in 1999, the ABA did amend its
Model Code to include "contribution limits and disclosure standards on
judges who must campaign for office," as well as requiring "judges to
disqualify themselves from hearing cases in which parties or their lawyers
contributed more than the allowed amounts to judges' campaign funds." 65
These amendments, as well as the ABA's official reaffirmation of its
preference for merit selection of judges, 66 illustrate a continuing concern
over judicial elections. It is clear, therefore, from both the ABA's constant
vigilance in regulating judicial campaigns, and from the numerous cases
involving judicial campaign speech that judicial campaign speech is a
legitimate threat to the integrity, impartiality, and independence of the
judiciary. As long as there are judicial elections, there must be some check
on judicial candidates' speech in order to preserve the judiciary.
The introduction of popular election of judges pushed an independent
judiciary into a world of politics and an appearance of partiality. In order
to preserve public confidence in the judiciary, the ABA created standards
which most states then adopted for judicial candidates to follow. While the

64.
65.
66.

Id. Canon Preamble.
Libby, supra note 20.
Id.
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language, format and style changed from the first Canons in 1924 to the
most recent 1990 Code, the constraints imposed by all three versions did
not differ markedly.6 7 The progression from the 1924 Canons to 1990
Code showed a more "specific, orderly, and succinct" presentation,68 but
maintained a common theme that judicial elections are unlike other
elections, and in order to preserve the impartiality, integrity, and
independence of the judiciary, campaign speech restrictions are crucial.
Currently, of the 43 states that have an elected or retained judiciary at some
level, all have adopted either some version of one of the ABA Canons or
Codes or have language based on one or more of the Canons and/or Codes.
These states, therefore, recognize that judicial elections are unlike all other
elections and attempt to acknowledge this distinction with a different set of
rules for judicial candidates. The following section explores some of the
cases involving judicial campaign speech that came before the White
decision. An examination of the problems in cases pre-dating White
foreshadows how much more rancorous post-White judicial campaigns may
be if left unchecked.
I.

JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN SPEECH PRE-WHITE

For years, candidates for judgeships almost unquestionably abided by
their state's restrictions on their campaign speech, blissfully avoiding
discussing political issues by using their state's Judicial Code as a shield.
But that has increasingly changed in the past few decades. In the mid to
late 1980s, judicial candidates began to challenge speech restrictions on
69
judicial candidates as violating the candidates' First Amendment rights.
The 1990s marked the successes of some First Amendment challenges in
federal court to the judicial campaign speech restrictions.7 ° Since the first
few successful First Amendment challenges, judicial elections have
become even more dirty and contentious requiring sanctions ranging from
admonitions to removal. 7' All of these violations of judicial campaign

67.
See SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 34, at 356-57.
68. Id.
69.
See Berger v. Supreme Court of Ohio, 598 F. Supp. 69 (S.D. Ohio 1984); In re
Kaiser, 759 P.2d 392 (Wash. 1988).
70.
See ACLU v. Fla. Bar, 744 F. Supp. 1094 (N.D. Fla. 1990); J.C.J.D. v.
R.J.C.R., 803 S.W.2d 953 (Ky. 1991); Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224
(7th Cir. 1993).
71.
See In re Hildebrandt, 675 N.E.2d 889 (Ohio 1997) (sanctioning the candidate
for advertisements that misled the public concerning his opponent's voting record in
Congress); Summe v. Judicial Ret. and Removal Comm'n, 947 S.W.2d 42 (Ky. 1997)
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speech restrictions occurred before the U.S. Supreme Court decided White,
making one wonder what type of judicial campaign speech will now occur
in light of White.
A.

THE EARLY YEARS

Before judicial candidates began their crusade for First Amendment
rights, the court's role in disciplinary hearings of judicial candidates was
essentially to examine on a case-by-case basis whether what the candidate
did violated that state's Judicial Code of Ethics. In re Baker is a good
example of such a case. 72 Kansas' Canon 7B(1)(c) Code of Judicial
Conduct, which is similar to the 1972 ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct, prohibited a judicial candidate from:
[Making] pledges or promise of conduct in office other
than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of
the office; or mispresent[ing] [sic] his identity,
qualifications, present position, or other fact; or
[announcing] his views on disputed legal or political
issues, except that he may answer allegations directed
against his record in office.73
A Commission on Judicial Qualifications recommended a public
censure after finding that some of candidate Baker's campaign letters, a
radio speech, a television commercial, and a postcard violated the above
provision. 74 The letter, speech, and commercial attacked his incumbent's
ill health and absenteeism because of that ill health.75 The postcard
insinuated erroneously that a loss for his opponent would not be
devastating because he would be able to collect disability and retire with a

(sanctioning the candidate for campaign literature designed to mislead the public concerning
her opponent's stance on child abuse); In re Alley, 699 So.2d 1369 (Fla. 1997) (sanctioning
the candidate for inaccurately attacking her opponent's qualifications and past); In re
Burick, 705 N.E.2d 422 (Ohio 1999) (sanctioning the candidate for misleading
advertisements regarding her opponent's appointment); In re Hein, 706 N.E.2d 34 (Ohio
1999) (sanctioning the candidate for misleading accusations leveled against his opponent
and criticizing a sentence pending before the Court of Appeals); In re McMillan, 797 So.2d
560 (Fla. 2001) (removing a candidate for making promises, making unfounded attacks
against his opponent, and presiding over a case in which he had a direct conflict of interest).
72.
In re Baker, 542 P.2d 701 (Kan. 1975).
73.
Id. at 703.
74.
Id. at 704.
75.

Id.
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76

nice pension.
Baker challenged the Commission's findings not on
constitutional grounds, but on the grounds that his campaign speech did not
violate the Canon.
Applying the facts to the Canon, the Kansas Supreme Court partially
agreed with Baker finding that the letter, speech, and commercial were
permissible pledges for the "'faithful performance' of the duties of judicial
office and are ...proper subjects for a judicial candidate's pledge," as well
as stating that "nothing in the Canons ...would immunize a judge from
criticism, whether for faults produced by ill health or any other cause. 7 7
The Court disagreed with Baker on the issue of the postcard, finding that it
was a misrepresentation of fact since the incumbent was not disabled and
would receive no retirement benefits.78
This simpler time when courts had only to determine whether judicial
campaign speech violated the specific code or canon came to an end less
than a decade later. Judicial candidates began to assert First Amendment
free speech rights requiring that courts apply strict scrutiny by examining
the state's interest and determining whether the restriction was narrowly
tailored. In the beginning, it appeared that the state's compelling interest
might beat the candidate's First Amendment rights.
B.

UNSUCCESSFUL FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES

The First Amendment prohibits Congress from making laws that
curtail free speech 79 and according to Gitlow v. New York, the Fourteenth
Amendment applies the First Amendment to the states. 80 The U.S.
Supreme Court has recognized that political speech during a campaign for
non-judicial public office is clearly protected by the First Amendment. 8
But, early on, courts accepted that judicial campaigns are different from
those that the U.S. Supreme Court had addressed, so they had to determine
whether the difference between judicial and non-judicial campaigns
justified restrictions on the candidates' speech.

76.
Id. at 706.
77.
Id. at 705-06.
78.
Baker, 542 P.2d at 706.
79.
U.S. CONST. amend. I. It states: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
80.
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
81.
O'Hara,supra note 40, at 202 (citing Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265,
271-72 (1971); Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 53 (1982); Eu v. S.F. County Democratic
Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989)).
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Berger v. Supreme Court of Ohio

In 1984, the Southern District of Ohio was the first federal court to
82
examine the constitutionality of judicial campaign speech restrictions.
Plaintiff Sanford Berger sought a preliminary injunction to prevent
83
enforcement of Canon 7B(1)(c) of Ohio's Code of Judicial Conduct. 84
Ohio's Canon 7B(l)(c), which is identical to the ABA's 1972 Canon 7,
contains a "pledges or promises" clause, an "announce" clause, and a
"misrepresent" clause. 85 Berger wanted to pledge his intention to require
mediation of divorces, to criticize the "excessive use of trial referees by the
court" as well as "traditional dehumanizing procedures," and finally to
announce his "philosophy" or "platform., 86 Berger contended that he
could be punished under Canon 7B(l)(c) for doing any of these things and
that such a restriction on his speech violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. 87 Berger alternatively argued that "there are no ascertainable
standards as to what constitutes a statement with regard to the 'faithful and
impartial performance of one's duties in office,"' so the rules had a
"chilling" effect on his right to free speech and should be declared vague.88
Finally, Berger claimed Canon 7B(1)(c)
violated the Equal Protection
89
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
After determining Berger had standing, the Court declared that Canon
7B(1)(c) was subject to strict scrutiny as it impaired candidates' First
Amendment rights. 90 The District Court began its analysis of Berger's
claim by focusing on the language of Canon 7B(l)(c). 9 1 By looking at the
plain language, the Court found that "criticisms of judicial administrations
and incumbents, assuming such criticisms are not untruthful or misleading"
are not prohibited, regardless of the fact that the Disciplinary Counsel
issued an opinion stating otherwise.92 As far as what Berger wished to say,

82.
Berger v. Supreme Court of Ohio, 598 F. Supp. 69 (S.D. Ohio 1984), affid, 861
F.2d 719, No. 87-3935, slip op. at 2-4 (6th Cir. Oct. 31, 1988) (affirming for the grounds
stated in the district court's opinion).
83.
Berger, 598 F. Supp. at 71.
84.
1972 MODEL CODE, supra note 44, Canon 7B(l)(c). See supra note 52 and
accompanying text.
85.
Berger, 598 F. Supp. at 72.
86.
Id.
87.
Id.
88.
Id.
89.
Id.
90.
Id. at 75 (citing Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n, 565 F.2d 295, 300 (5th Cir.
1977)).
91.
Craig, supra note 38, at 420.
92.
Berger, 598 F. Supp. at 75.
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the Court found that his "pledges" related to the faithful performance of the
duties of judicial office and were thus exempted from Canon 7B(1)(c). 93
Even though it held that Berger's pledges would not violate Canon
7B(l)(c), the Court went on to state that the state's regulation was
necessary to achieve the compelling state interest of "assuring that its
elected judges are protected from untruthful criticism and that judicial
campaigns are run in a manner so as not to damage the actual and
perceived integrity of state judges and the bar., 94 Finally, the Court
disposed of the vagueness and equal protection claims by stating that
Berger could not establish a substantial likelihood of either an unclear
intent and/or meaning or of a denial of equal protection. 95
While the main part of the Berger opinion addressed the fact that
Berger's statements would not violate Canon7B(1)(c), the Court still made
it a point to establish that the state had a compelling interest in regulating
judicial campaign speech. Quoting Morial, the Court emphasized the
state's compelling interest:
Ours is an era in which members of the judiciary often are
called upon to adjudicate cases squarely presenting hotly
contested social or political issues. The state's interest in
ensuring that judges be and appear to be neither
antagonistic nor beholden to any96interest, party, or person
is entitled to the greatest respect.
Considering the media's coverage of major cases and pressure on
judges to voice opinions, for example the Microsoft case,97 this statement
would seem to ring truer today than in 1977.
2.

In re Kaiser

The Supreme Court of Washington not only found that some of a
judicial candidate's statements violated the state's Code of Judicial
Conduct, but also found some of those statements were also not

93.
Id.
94.
Id.
95.
Id. at 76.
96.
Id. at 75 (quoting Morial, 565 F.2d at 302).
97.
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (reprimanding
Judge Jackson for giving secret interviews about the Microsoft case while the case was still
in progress).
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constitutionally protected.9 8 Once again, Washington's Canon 9 was
identical to Canon 7B(l)(c) of the ABA's 1972 Model Code. The Court
found that candidate Judge Kaiser's statements that he is "toughest on
drunk driving" and "tough on drunk driving" singled out a "special class of
defendants and suggest[ed] that these DWI defendants' cases [would] be
held to a higher standard," so these promises violated Canon 7B(1)(c). l°°
However, promises to be a "tough no-nonsense judge" were permissible.' 0'
As for statements regarding his opponent, the Court found that
Kaiser's suggestion that DWI defense attorneys donated to his opponent's
campaign because "their primary interest is getting their clients off'
violated the Code. 0 2 Statements that the "majority of his opponent's
support came from 'drunk driving defense attorneys,"' while literally
violating the Code, were held to be constitutionally protected.10 3 The Court
applied strict scrutiny and determined that since there was no evidence that
Kaiser knew statements considering his opponent's funds were false, the
statements were constitutionally protected.'°4 Of course, strict scrutiny did
not protect the above statements that were determined to have violated the
Code because the Kaiser court found that the "State's interest in protecting
the good reputation of the judiciary is compelling, as every court which
considers the issue has recognized" and that the Canons were narrowly
drafted. 0 5 Even though some of Kaiser's statements were protected, the
fact that other0 6statements violated Washington's Code required that Kaiser
be censured.1
Both Berger and Kaiser are reminiscent of the early cases since they
both looked at the particular judicial campaign speech in question to
determine if it would violate the Canon of that state. However, these cases
added a new dimension by addressing First Amendment challenges and
recognizing a compelling state interest in restricting judicial campaign
speech in order to preserve the impartiality and integrity of the judiciary.
Kaiser, though, signals the times to come by recognizing that while some
statements literally violated the "misrepresent" clause, the speech was still
constitutionally protected since knowledge of the falsity of the statements
could not be shown. Therefore, courts would not blindly punish a violation

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

In re Kaiser, 759 P.2d 392 (Wash. 1988).
Id. at 395-96.
Id. at 396.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 397.
Kaiser, 759 P.2d at 399.
Id. at 399-400.
Id. at 40 1.
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of the Code, but would instead look deeper and, perhaps, decide a violation
was protected by the First Amendment.
C.
SPLIT BETWEEN FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND THE STATE'S
COMPELLING INTEREST

During the 1990s courts began to uphold First Amendment challenges
against judicial campaign speech restrictions. 10 7 Some courts, however,
staunchly persisted in recognizing a compelling state interest and upheld
judicial campaign speech restrictions as constitutional. 10 8 It was this
ambiguity that the U.S. Supreme Court had to contemplate in the White
case.
1.

Recognition of Judicial Candidate'sFirstAmendment Rights

Federal and state courts alike began to recognize that even though
judicial candidates are different from other non-judicial candidates, judicial
candidates are still entitled to some constitutionally protected free speech
during their campaigns. Using strict scrutiny, courts began to knock down
judicial campaign speech restrictions despite a compelling state interest in
maintaining them.
a.

ACLU v. Florida Bar

In 1990, the first court to strike down a Canon similar to Canon
7B(1)(c) of the 1972 Code of Judicial Conduct' °9 was ACLU v. Florida
Bar."o Once again, this case involved a motion for a preliminary
injunction to enjoin enforcement of Canon 7B(1)(c) of Florida's Code of
Judicial Conduct, in particular the "announce" clause."' Only this time,
the District Court enjoined enforcement of the Canon," 2 and did so without

107.
See ACLU v. Fla. Bar, 744 F. Supp. 1094 (N.D. Fla. 1990); J.C.J.D. v.
R.J.C.R., 803 S.W.2d 953 (Ky. 1991); Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224
(7th Cir. 1993) (Buckley II); Beshear v. Butt, 863 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Ark. 1994).
108.
See Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court of Pa., 944 F.2d 137 (3d
Cir. 1991); Ackerson v. Ky. Judicial Ret. and Removal Comm'n, 776 F. Supp. 309 (W.D.
Ky. 1991); Deters v. Judicial Ret. and Removal Comm'n, 873 S.W.2d 200 (Ky. 1994).
109.
Craig, supra note 38, at 422.
110. ACLU, 744 F. Supp. 1094.
111.
Id. at 1096.
112.
Id. at 1099.
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an evidentiary hearing or oral argument and just three weeks before the
1990 general election.', 3
Unlike the previous cases, no particular judicial campaign speech was
in question. Instead, the ACLU and Judge Charles Horn' 14 only challenged
the Canon's constitutionality, specifically the "announce" clause. The
court applied strict scrutiny and stated that "[w]here, as here, a regulation
goes so far as to restrict speech because of its content, there is a strong
presumption that the regulation is unconstitutional." '"1 5 As courts did in
previous cases, the court here acknowledged that "states need not treat
candidates for judicial office the same as candidates for other elective
offices," but then went on to say "a person does not surrender his
constitutional right to freedom of speech when he becomes a candidate for
judicial office."' 16 Interestingly, the court claims to accept that Florida has
a "compelling interest in protecting the integrity of the judiciary," but held
that prohibiting "all discussion of disputed legal and political issues" is not
the "most narrowly drawn means of protecting that interest."' 7 The court's
claimed interest in the state's compelling interest is undermined when it
states that the public can "place the [judicial campaign speech] in its proper
perspective" and that the "judicial candidates' views on disputed legal and
political issues" are relevant in the public's election decisions.' ' 8 It appears
that the "compelling state interest" in protecting the integrity of the
judiciary is not really compelling if there is no danger in the public putting
the speech in the wrong context.
The court in ACLU v. FloridaBar clearly places judicial candidates'
First Amendment rights and the public's desire for information above the
integrity of the judiciary. The court's assertion that "[l]awyers and judges
are members of a privileged and responsible profession, and their
obedience to the profession's ethical precepts may require abstention from
what in other circumstances would be constitutionally protected behavior"
119 seems to be just an empty proclamation.

113.
114.

115.

116.
117.

118.
119.

Shepard, supra note 30, at 1068.
Id.
ACLU,744 F. Supp. at 1097.
Id.
Id.
at 1098.
Id.at 1099.
Id.at 1097.
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J.C.J.D. v. R.J.C.R.

The Kentucky Supreme Court also felt strongly about a judicial
candidate's right to free speech in J.C.J.D v. R.J.C.R.2I
With Canon
7B(l)(c)'s "announce clause" once again at issue, the court held the clause
to be unconstitutional because it was not "narrowly drawn."'' In this case,
Justice Combs, as a judicial candidate, "discuss[ed] opinions that he ...
authored, criticiz[ed] his opponent's position on legal issues, and
explain[ed] to the public his judicial philosophy."' 122 There was no issue as
to whether his statements violated the Canon, but instead the issues were
"whether the enacted regulation [had] been so narrowly drafted, and strictly
applied, that the compelling state interest [was] served without
unnecessarily burdening the exercise of free speech."' 123 The court
recognized a "compelling interest to protect and preserve the integrity and
objectivity of the judicial system," but held that since the "announce"
clause prohibited all discussion "of a judicial candidate's views on disputed
legal or political issues" it was not narrowly tailored. 24 But, the Court here
gave the state some guidance as to how to narrowly tailor the Canon when
it referred approvingly to the ABA's 1990 Model Code which replaced the
"announce" clause with a narrower "commit" clause. 25 So, even though
the Court struck down the "announce" clause, it left an opening for judicial
campaign speech restrictions to be constitutionally utilized.
c.

Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board

The Seventh Circuit in Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board not
only found Illinois' "announce" clause overbroad, but also found that
Illinois' "pledges or promises" clause was overbroad limiting further the
possible permissible alternatives in restricting judicial campaign speech so
as to preserve the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. 2 6
The Buckley case is a consolidation of two cases. 2 7 In the first case,
the Judicial Inquiry Board filed a complaint when Justice Buckley stated in

120.
J.C.J.D., 803 S.W.2d 953.
121.
Id. at 956.
122.
Id. at 955-56.
123.
Id. at 955.
124.
Id. at 956.
125.
Id. See also 1990 MODEL CODE, supra note 63 and accompanying text.
126.
997 F.2d 224.
127.
Buckley v. I11.
Judicial Inquiry Bd., 801 F. Supp. 83 (N.D. III. 1992)
(Buckley 1).
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campaign materials, "he had never authored an opinion reversing a rape
conviction."' 128 While Justice Buckley was not sanctioned, he sued in court
to determine whether Illinois' rule is constitutional. 129 The second case
involved an attorney, Anthony Young, running for judge who wanted to,
but refrained from making statements that could have violated Illinois'
Rule 67B(1)(c) 3 ° which is similar to the 1972 ABA Model Code's Canon
7B(1)(c).
The Buckley district court upheld Illinois' rule restricting judicial
campaign speech. The court recognized Illinois' interest in maintaining
"public confidence in judicial impartiality and integrity, since the
perception of judicial partiality and corruption, whether true or not, breed
disrespect for the law and extralegal self-help."' 31 Furthermore, the court
held that Illinois' proviso which "allows a judicial candidate to announce
his views on measures to improve the law, the legal system, or the
administration of justice without fear of sanction" narrows the rule to only
thus saving the rule from
issues that are likely to come before the judge
33
32
being overbroad. 1 The plaintiffs appealed. 1
In the Seventh Circuit the plaintiffs found a more sympathetic figure
in Judge Posner. 134 Judge Posner, while acknowledging the differences
between judicial and non-judicial candidates, nevertheless struck down the
"pledges or promises" clause and the "announce" clause as reaching
beyond unprotected speech. 35 Judge Posner was not convinced that the
proviso could save the clause 136 and felt the narrowing interpretations
applied by the magistrate judge and district court was improper
patchwork. 37 In the end, Judge Posner felt that:
[T]he principle of impartial justice under law is strong
enough to entitle government to restrict the freedom of
speech of participants in the judicial process, including
candidates for judicial office, but not so strong as to place

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

id. at 88.
Id.
Id. at 86.
Id. at 93 (quoting the Magistrate Judge's report).
Id. at 94.
Buckley I, 997 F.2d 224.
Id.
Id. at 228.
Id. at 229.
Id. at 230.
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that process completely outside the scope
of the
38
constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech.
Of course, Judge Posner seemed to give the ABA's new "commit"
clause a nod of approval suggesting perhaps that
some judicial campaign
39
speech restrictions might survive strict scrutiny.
While the above cases are not exhaustive of all those striking down
judicial campaign speech restrictions, they together show a mentality in
which a compelling interest in preserving the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary will not alone save a restriction on speech. New interests
emerged including the candidate's First Amendment right to free speech
and the public's interest in knowing more information about judicial
candidates. These new interests appear to be overshadowing the once
bright interest in safeguarding the impartiality, independence, and integrity
of the judiciary.
2.

Recognition of the State's Compelling Interest

While some courts were invalidating judicial campaign speech
restrictions, other courts were upholding them. 40
By interpreting
restrictions narrowly or by applying newer narrower restrictions, some
courts were able to preserve judicial campaign speech restrictions even in
the face of First Amendment challenges. These cases suggest that a
compelling state interest could still overcome a First Amendment
challenge.
a.

Stretton v. Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Decided shortly before Buckley, Stretton v. DisciplinaryBoard of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvaniaupheld a judicial campaign restriction very
similar to the one Judge Posner invalidated.' 4' Stretton, an attorney and
candidate for judge, challenged Pennsylvania's Canon 7B(l)(c) as having
violated his First Amendment rights and preventing him from announcing
his views on issues ranging from "criminal sentencing and the rights of

138.
Id. at 231.
139.
Buckley H1, 997 F.2d 224.
140.
See Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court of Pa., 944 F.2d 137 (3d
Cir. 1991); Ackerson v. Ky. Judicial Ret. and Removal Comm'n, 776 F. Supp. 309 (W.D.
Ky. 1991); Deters v. Judicial Ret. and Removal Comm'n, 873 S.W.2d 200 (Ky. 1994).
141.
944 F.2d 137.
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victims of crime" to the "need for greater sensitivity toward hiring minority
lawyers and law clerks, especially by the county's judges and district
attorney."'' 42 The District Court, reluctant to rewrite the Code, concluded43
that Canon7B(1)(c) was overbroad and violated the First Amendment.
The defendants appealed and urged a narrow construction 144 in which the
"announced" views would be limited to "situations in which the
candidate's speech
pertains to matters that may come before the court for
45
resolution."1
The Third Circuit here, unlike the Seventh Circuit in Buckley, found
that not only did Pennsylvania demonstrate a compelling state interest, but
also that the restriction could be interpreted narrowly as the representatives
of the Disciplinary Board urged, and thus survive an overbreath
challenge. 46 The court felt a narrow interpretation was appropriate for a
number of reasons. First, the Judicial Inquiry Review Board, which is "a
straw in the wind indicating the direction that [the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court] will go," indicated that the Canon would in reality be applied in the
narrower sense. 147 Also, a restrictive construction was "consistent with
other provisions of the Code."' 148 Finally, a narrow interpretation would be
more in line with the state's compelling interest. 49 In the end, the Court
felt that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would restrict the phrase
"announce his views on disputed legal or political issues"' 50 to include only
issues "likely to come before the court" thus 5 narrowly tailoring the
restriction to serve the state's compelling interest.' '
The difference between Stretton and Buckley is found by looking at
each courts' focus. In Buckley the focus was on the candidate's First
Amendment rights. In contrast, the Stretton court focused on "the
importance of quality in the state judiciary and concluded that a state has a
compelling interest in the integrity of its judiciary."' 152 Quoting Justice
Stewart in Landmark Communications,Inc. v. Virginia153 the Stretton court

142.
143.

Id. at 139.
Id. at 140.

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 142-43.
Stretton, 944 F.2d at 143.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 144.
Shepard, supra note 30, at 1074.
435 U.S. 829, 848 (1978).

144.
145.

Id.
Id. at 143.
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reiterated, "[t]here could hardly be a higher15governmental
interest than a
4
State's interest in the quality of its judiciary."
b. Ackerson v. Kentucky Judicial Retirement and Removal Commission
and Deters v. Judicial Retirement and Removal Commission
The Ackerson and Deters cases are different from all of the previous
cases because at issue is Kentucky's amended Canon 7B(1)(c) which,
instead of containing an "announce" clause, contained a "commit" clause
identical to the 1990 ABA Model Code Canon 5A3(d)(ii). 55 The District
Court in Ackerson and the Kentucky Supreme Court in Deters, both held
that the "commit"
clause was a constitutional restriction on judicial
156
campaign speech.
In Ackerson a judicial candidate brought a §1983 claim against the
Kentucky Judicial Retirement and Removal Commission for violating his
First Amendment rights.157 Ackerson wanted to both make statements
committing him with respect to administrative matters and statements
committing him on general legal issues not presently before the Kentucky
Court of Appeals. 58 Applying strict scrutiny, the court examined the two
different sets of statements separately. 59
First, statements concerning court administration would literally be
prohibited under Canon 7.1'6 But, the Court recognized that "[tihere is no
compelling state interest which justifies limiting a judicial candidate's
speech on court administrative issues," and the Commission pointed out
that it would probably never discipline a candidate for such a statement.16 '
Therefore, the Court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement62
of Canon 7 with respect to statements regarding administrative issues.1
As for the statements committing the candidate "with respect to legal issues
which are not presently before the Kentucky Court of Appeals but which
are likely to come before that Court,', 16 3 the Court found there was a

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Stretton, 944 F.2d at 142.
Ackerson, 776 F. Supp. at 311; Deters, 873 S.W.2d at 201.
Ackerson, 776 F. Supp. at 311; Deters, 873 S.W.2d at 201.
Ackerson, 776 F. Supp. at 310.
Id.
Id. at 311.
Id. at 313-15.
Id. at 314.
Id. at 315-16.
Ackerson, 776 F. Supp. at 314.
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compelling state interest in limiting these statements.' 64 Such statements
"tend[] to undermine the fundamental fairness and impartiality of the legal
system," and thus should not be allowed. 65 Not only did the court find a
compelling state interest, but since the restriction was limited to issues
likely to come before the court, it was also narrowly tailored.' 66 Therefore,
as Canon 7's "commit" clause applied to legal issues likely to come before
the court, it was a constitutional restriction on judicial campaign speech.
In the Deters case, the Kentucky Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the "commit" clause and determined its scope. 67 Mr.
Deters, while a judicial candidate, approved a political advertisement to be
run in a Catholic newspaper that declared him to be a "Pro-Life Candidate"
even after the Judicial Retirement and Removal Commission had publicly
censured him for identifying himself as a member of a political party in
earlier campaign materials.168 The Commission found the statement to be
one which "commit[ed] or appear[ed] to commit the candidate to a position
with respect169 to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before
the court.'
Mr. Deters first argued that the abortion issue was not one which was
likely to come before the court as there were no abortion clinics in the
county and no abortion cases had been heard in the county for over a
decade.170 The Court quickly disposed of this argument since there was
still a possibility of an abortion case coming before him either in his county
or as a substitute for another county.' 7' Mr. Deters' alternative argument
that the Canon violated his First Amendment rights was more closely
examined, but the result was the same as it was in Ackerson, the "commit"
clause was upheld as having been "sufficiently and closely drawn so as to
avoid unnecessary abridgement
of a judicial candidate's right of free
172
speech during the campaign."'
An examination of the judicial campaign speech cases prior to White
reveals the different approaches that could be taken when evaluating the
constitutionality of such restrictions; illustrates the various interests that
can be emphasized; and demonstrates the ambiguity prior to White. These
cases left many legal scholars wondering what approach the U.S. Supreme

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 315.
Id.
Id.
Deters, 873 S.W.2d 200.
Id.
Id. at 202.
Id. at 203.
Id.
Id. at 204.
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Court would take. Which interests would the nine Justices find most
compelling? Would the White decision eliminate the uncertainty? As will
be shown, the White case clouds the area more than it clarifies.
IV.

A.

MINNESOTA REPUBLICAN PARTY V. WHITE

BACKGROUND

Minnesota was admitted to the Union in 1858, and like most of the
states being admitted around that time, Minnesota's State Constitution
provided for judicial selection through popular election.'
In 1912,
Minnesota's judicial elections were deemed nonpartisan, and in 1974 a
restriction on judicial candidate's speech was promulgated in Canon
5A(3)(d)(i) which stated that judicial candidates shall not "announce his or
her

views

on

disputed

legal

or

political

issues."' 174

While

a

recommendation to adopt the more narrow restriction set forth in the 1990
ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct was proposed to the Minnesota
75
Supreme Court in June of 1994, it was never adopted.
In 1996 Gregory F. Wersal entered the race for Associate Justice of
the Minnesota Supreme Court. 176 During the campaign, Wersal's campaign
committee, wife, brother, and the Republican Party or Affiliated
Association engaged in speech on Wersal's behalf that led to the filing of a
complaint with the Office of Professional Responsibility.177 Wersal's
supporters attended Republican Party gatherings and distributed campaign
literature and/or spoke at the gatherings; they announced Wersal's judicial
philosophy and criticized Minnesota Supreme Court decisions; they
identified Wersal as a Republican and sought the Republican Party's
endorsement for Wersal; and they solicited campaign contributions.178 The
complaint was investigated, but dismissed because the Director of the
Office of Professional Responsibility felt that the Canons restricting
attending political gatherings were ambiguous, that only the candidate, not

173.

Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 768 (2002) (citing the

174.
175.
(Kelly I).
176.
177.
178.

Id.
Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 63 F. Supp. 2d 967, 973 (D. Minn. 1999)

MINN. CONST. art. VI

§

Id. at 972.
Id.
Id.

7).
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his supporters, was prohibited from personally seeking endorsements, and
that the "announce" clause was constitutionally suspect and a violation
would be hard to prove in Wersal's case. 7 9 Despite the dismissal of the
complaint, Wersal withdrew his candidacy for fear of further complaints
180
that could jeopardize his ability to practice law.
Wersal decided to run again in 1998.18' In 1997, the Minnesota
Supreme Court had adopted amendments to the Judicial Code which in
relevant part clearly restricted candidates from identifying themselves as
"members of a political organization," and restricted them from seeking,
' 82
accepting, or using "endorsements from a political organization.,
Wersal, therefore, sought an advisory opinion as to whether he would be
disciplined if he spoke on his own behalf at political gatherings; sought,
accepted, or used endorsements from political parties; and announced his
The Office of Professional
views on disputed legal issues. 83
Responsibility answered yes to the first two actions, but did not answer the
third question since they did not know specifically what "announcements"
Wersal wanted to make. 84
B.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1.

The Complaint

In 1998, Wersal, Wersal's campaign committee, wife, brother, and the
Republican Party of Minnesota and its Affiliated Associations among
others filed a motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary
injunction to enjoin the Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility
Board, the Minnesota Office of Lawyers Responsibility and the Minnesota
Board of Judicial Standards from enforcing those parts of Canon 5 that
"prohibits judicial candidates from exercising their rights of free speech
and free association guaranteed under the First Amendment."', 85 The
Plaintiffs asserted five claims: (1) prohibitions on attending and speaking at
political gatherings infringe on a candidates' free speech and association

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 973.
Id.
Id.
Kelly 1, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 971.
Id. at 973-74.
Id. at 974.
Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 996 F. Supp. 875, 875-76 (D. Minn. 1998).
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rights; (2) prohibitions on candidates' announcing their views on disputed
legal or political issues violate free speech rights; (3) and (4) the ban on
identifying the candidate's political party or seeking, accepting, or using
political endorsements violate principles of free speech, association, and
equal protection; and (5) the ban on personal solicitation of campaign
contribution by candidates also violated free speech. 86 The District Court
denied the plaintiffs' motion finding that Minnesota had a compelling
interest in the restrictions and acknowledging that the cases holding the
"announce" clause overbroad were persuasive, but finding that a balancing
of the hardships weighed in favor of maintaining the status quo until the
Court could more carefully examine the issues. 187 In an unpublished
opinion, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial
of the motion without
88
expressing an opinion on the merits of the case.'
2.

The DistrictCourt

The District Court divided the plaintiffs complaint into three parts:
Bans on Political activity, Ban on Judicial Candidate Personally Soliciting
Contributions, and Announce Clause. 89 Initially, the Court recognized that
just because Minnesota chose to elect its judges did not extinguish a state
interest in an impartial judiciary. 90 When examining the bans on political
activity, the court acknowledged that Minnesota had a "compelling interest
in maintaining the actual and apparent integrity and independence of its
judiciary" and that the restrictions were narrowly tailored to serve that
interest.' 9' The ban on personal solicitation of contributions by the judicial
candidate was attacked not for lack of a compelling state interest, but for
not being narrowly
tailored. 92 The Court, however, did not find this attack
93
1
to be persuasive.
Finally, the Court examined the constitutionality of the "announce"
clause. The Court recognized that every previous court examining the
same or a similar restriction had found "that the state has a compelling
interest in limiting the First Amendment rights of judicial candidates in

186. Id. at 878.
187.
Id. at 878-79.
188. Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 163 F.3d 602, No. 98-1625 (8th Cir. filed
Nov. 2, 1998).
189. Kelly , 63 F. Supp. 2d at 967.
190.
Id. at 975.
191.
Id. at 980.
192. Id. at 982-983.
193. Id. at 983.
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order to maintain the actual and apparent impartiality and independence of
the judiciary," and that the real issue was whether the clause was narrowly
tailored to serve that interest.194 Lining up Stretton against Buckley, the
Court examined the opposing arguments between applying a narrowing
construction or not. 195 The Court concluded that when narrowly construed
as "prohibiting a candidate only from announcing a position on an issue
that may come before the court for resolution," the "announce" clause was
constitutional. 196 Following the rule laid out in Stretton that "every
reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from
unconstitutionality," the Court found that the Minnesota Supreme Court
197
would interpret the clause narrowly and it would then be constitutional.
98
Thus, the defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted.
3.

The Eighth Circuit

a.

The Majority Opinion

The Appellate Court began its analysis by acknowledging that there
were important differences between the judiciary and the executive and
legislative branches that "affect[ed] the nature of the candidate's interest in
certain kinds of policy debate."'' 99 While it was important for the public to
know about executive and legislative candidate's plans to enact and
administer laws, the judicial system is "based on the concept of
individualized decisions on challenged conduct and interpretations of law
enacted by the other branches of government.,, 200 Therefore, restrictions on
judicial campaign speech must be evaluated differently from restrictions
Furthermore, even though the
placed on non-judicial candidates. 20
restrictions were content-based restrictions, they did not discriminate
against particular viewpoints, so the burden on the First Amendment rights

Id. at 984 (citing Buckley v. Ill. Judiciary Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 227-28
194.
(7th Cir. 1993); Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. Of the Supreme Court of Pa., 944 F.2d 137, 142
(3d Cir. 1991); Ackerson v. Ky. Judicial Ret. And Removal Comm'n, 776 F. Supp. 309, 312
(W.D. Ky. 1991); ACLU v. Fla. Bar, 744 F. Supp. 1094, 1097 (N.D. Fla. 1990); Berger v.
Supreme Court of Ohio, 598 F. Supp.69, 74 (S.D. Ohio 1984)).
195.
Kelly 1, 63 F. Supp.2d at 984-85.
196.
Id.
Id. at 984-85.
197.
Id. at 986.
198.
Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 862 (8th Cir. 2001) (Kelly
199.

tI).

200.
201.

Id.
Id. at 863.
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were less onerous. 202 Despite these facts, though, strict scrutiny was still
deemed appropriate.20 3
As did the District Court, the Eighth Circuit found Minnesota had a
compelling interest in Canon 5 and concentrated more on whether the
restrictions were narrowly tailored. 20 4 Also, as the District Court did, the
Appellate Court divided its analysis into three categories addressing the
ban on political activity first. 20 5 The Court recognized that "political
parties in judicial campaigns [posed] a greater threat to the compelling state
interests than involvement of other kinds of groups ' '2°6 and that the
restriction was narrowly tailored, not unduly vague, and not a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause.20 7 The ban on candidates personally soliciting
funds was likewise deemed narrowly tailored.20 8
When addressing the "announce" clause, the Court took time to
discuss how it furthered the compelling interest in the "independence and
actual and perceived impartiality of the judiciary. ' 2 ° First, the Court
discussed the necessity of the "announce" clause despite the fact that the
"pledges or promises" clause was also in place in Minnesota. 2 0 Because
the "pledges or promises" clause did not reach all the judicial campaign
speech that could "undermine the State's interest," the "announce" clause
was necessary. 2 1 Next, the Court emphasized the dilemma a judicial
candidate who later became a judge may face if allowed to make campaign
announcements. 1 2 If a judge stays true to his or her announcement, the
judge risks appearing as if he or she prejudged the case, but if the judge
finds opposite of his or her announcement, the judge risks being "assailed
as a dissembler., 2 13 Finally, the Court discussed the "evidence of
widespread and longstanding consensus among members of the bench and
bar about the necessity of restrictions on campaign speech that conveyed a
judicial candidate's propensity to decide cases in a particular way. ,,214

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id. at 863-64.
Id. at 864.
Id. at 867-68.
Kelly 11, 247 F.3d at 868.
Id. at 872.
Id. at 873-76.
Id. at 885.
Id. at 881.
Id. at 877.
Kelly 11, 247 F.3d at 877.
Id. at 878.
Id.
Id. at 879.
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After reaffirming the fact that the state had an undeniably compelling
interest in restricting judicial campaign speech, the Court examined the
District Court's narrowing construction of the "announce" clause without
looking at whether the Court erred in its construction as the plaintiffs failed
to raise that issue in their opening briefs.2t 5 The Court added, though, that
21 6
it would not have found error even if it had been properly at issue.
Citing Stretton, the Court declared it, too, believed the newly interpreted
"announce" clause was narrowly tailored because it restricted
announcements which were designed to show a candidate would "decide
cases in a certain way if elected into office," but did not prohibit candidates
from announcing their "character, fitness, integrity, background .
education, legal experience, work habits, and abilities., 2 17 The Court
further determined that the Minnesota Supreme Court would not prohibit
discussion of administrative matters or discussion of appellate court
218
Therefore, the narrowly construed "announce" clause would
decisions.
be constitutional.
b.

The Dissent

Judge Beam disagreed with the Court's result and issued a dissenting
opinion.
Employing a lengthy discussion of Minnesota's history of
electing its judges, Judge Beam argued that Minnesota did not "historically
pursue the ideal of an independent judiciary,, 219 and thus Minnesota could
not assert a "fundamental policy interest in 'independent' judicial elections
to even warrant
. . .proceeding to the next stage of . . .constitutional
220
inquiry.,
Even if judicial independence, which Judge Beam agreed was of the
utmost importance, were asserted, the restrictions should still be struck
down for violating the First Amendment because judicial independence
must give way to the Constitution. 221 Judge Beam discussed various
interests that the First Amendment protects: the right to campaign during an
election, the candidate's right to association, the voters' right to
information about the candidate, a political party's right to endorse a

215.
216.

Id. at 881.
Id.

218.

Id.

217.

219.

220.
221.

Kelly I, 247 F.3d at 882.
Id. at 886 (Beam, J., dissenting).

Id. at 89 1.
Id. at 891-92.
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222

According to Judge Beam, Canon 5 unconstitutionally
candidate.
infringed upon these rights and "[b]eyond prohibiting fraud and corruption,
and the appearance of the same, a state may prevent judicial candidates
from prejudging or pledging outcomes in specific cases or even in
particular types of case," but can restrict nothing else.223 Narrowing the
''announce" clause to "issues likely to come before the candidate" still
restricted more than constitutionally permissible.224
Since Minnesota chose to elect its judges, Judge Beam felt that it must
"commit itself to a complete election replete with free speech and
association. 225 The state could not insulate the judiciary from the "rigors
of public debate, particularly in the election context" 226 for "[i]n the eyes of
the First Amendment, [candidates for any type of office] are the same. 22 7
Finally, Judge Beam felt that Canon 5 was not narrowly tailored
because it did "not achieve its stated end" and therefore could not be
necessary and would be ineffective.228 Referring essentially to the ban on
political activity, Judge Beam claimed the restrictions did not maintain the
impartiality and integrity of the judiciary because they covered only
political parties while other much more influential groups were still open to
the candidate.229 In the end, Judge Beam believed little, if any, restrictions
on judicial candidates' campaigns would be permitted in the face of the
First Amendment.
D.

THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S DECISION

When the U.S. Supreme Court decided to hear the case, the only issue
certified was "whether the First Amendment permit[ted] the Minnesota
Supreme Court to prohibit candidates for judicial election in that State from
announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues., 230 Lines of
supporters filed behind both the petitioner and respondent. The Supreme
Court had to sift through the many interests supporters of both sides were
touting going beyond just the compelling state interest and the candidate's
First Amendment interests to include the interest of third parties in

222.
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224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id. at 892-94.
Kelly II, 247 F.3d at 894.
Id.
Id. at 897.
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Id. at 899.
Id. at 900.
Kelly 11, 247 F.3d at 901-02.
White, 536 U.S. at 768.

2004]

JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN SPEECH RESTRICTION

receiving information2 3 1 and the due process rights of litigants.232 In the
end, a five to four majority held the restriction to be unconstitutional and
reversed the appellate and district courts.2 33
1.

The Majority Opinion

The majority opinion was written by Justice Antonin Scalia and was
joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day
O'Connor, Anthony Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas.234 In writing for the
majority, Scalia began the analysis by clarifying the language in question: a
judicial candidate "shall not announce his or her views on disputed legal or
political issues. 235 This statement, Scalia felt, covered "more than
promising to decide an issue a particular way" since Minnesota's "pledges
or promises" clause prohibits "pledges or promises of conduct in office
other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the
office., 236 Therefore, the plain language of the "announce" clause would
restrict a substantial amount of speech. However, the Minnesota Supreme
Court and Judicial Board limited the scope of the announce clause, so that
statements by Wersal in his 1996 campaign that criticized the Minnesota
Supreme Court, in general and for specific decisions, were not considered
announcing views on disputed legal issues. 237 Also, the District Court,
Eighth Circuit, and recently the Minnesota Supreme Court further limited
the clause to reach only issues "likely to come before the candidate. 238
Justice Scalia, however, found these limits to be illusory due to statements
made on behalf of the respondent at oral arguments that attempted to
exemplify the limitations and to the fact that a limitation on issues likely to
come before the court was not a limitation at all since "there is almost no
legal or political issue that is unlikely to come before a judge of an

231.
Brief of Amici Curiae U.S. Chamber of Commerce, White, 536 U.S. 765 (No.
01-521); Brief of Amici Curiae American Center for Law & Justice, White, 536 U.S. 765
(No. 01-521).
232.
Brief of Amici Curiae Ad Hoc Committee of Former Justices and Friends
Dedicated to an Independent Judiciary, White, 536 U.S. 765 (No. 01-521); Brief of Amici
Curiae Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, et al., White, 536 U.S. 765 (No.
01-521).
233.
White, 536 U.S. 765.
234.
Id.
235.
Id. at 770.
236.
Id.
237.
Id. at 771.
238.
Id. at 771-72 (citing Kelly 1, 63 F. Supp.2d at 986; Kelly 11, 247 F.3d at 881-82;
In re Code of Judicial Conduct, 639 N.W.2d 55 (Minn. 2002)).
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American court, state or federal, of general jurisdiction., 239 Therefore, it
appeared that the "announce" clause effectively prohibited almost all
judicial campaign speech of any interest, excepting of course the list of preapproved topics that the Judicial Board promulgated. 4° Having tossed
aside the District Court's, Appellate Court's, and Minnesota Supreme
Court's narrowing interpretation of the "announce" clause, the question
the First Amendment's
became whether the Judicial Board's
24 1 list "fulfill[ed]
speech.",
of
freedom
of
guarantee
Applying strict scrutiny, Scalia first examined the compelling state
interests of "preserving the impartiality of the state judiciary and preserving
the appearance of the impartiality of the state judiciary. 2 42 Feeling the
term "impartial" was too vague to determine whether it could be a
compelling interest, Scalia presented three possible meanings. 243 If
impartial meant "a lack of bias for or against either party to the
proceeding," then the "announce" clause was not narrowly tailored to serve
this impartiality since it restricted speech on issues not for or against a
party. 24 If impartial meant "lack of preconception in favor of or against a
particular legal view," then it would not be a compelling state interest since
"it is virtually impossible to find a judge who does not have preconceptions
about the law" and "[p]roof that a Justice's mind at the time he joined the
Court was a complete tabula rasa in the area of constitutional adjudication
would be evidence of lack of qualification, not lack of bias. 2 45 Finally, if
impartiality meant "open-mindedness," this could be desirable, but Scalia
refused to evaluate whether it would be compelling or narrowly tailored
because the Court "[did] not believe the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted
the announce clause for that purpose. 246
The reason Justice Scalia believed that "open-mindedness" was not
the purpose of the "announce" clause was that it regulated only campaign
statements while statements made prior to the campaign, which could just
as easily foreclose open-mindedness or appearance of open-mindedness,
were allowed.247 Scalia gave no weight to the fact that the context of the
statement, the context being that it was made during a campaign, could
"pose a special threat to open-mindedness because the candidate, when
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244.
245.
246.
247.
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elected judge will have a particularreluctance to contradict them., 248 If the
candidate made a promise, then the context could matter, but then the
"pledges or promises" clause would apply. 249 The context of the speech
should require more leniency than limitations since allowing candidates to
exercise their right to free speech through debating and discussing issues
has been deemed at the core of the First Amendment. °
Undermining judicial elections, rather than open-mindedness, was the
purpose behind the "announce" clause. 25' An argument that announcing a
view could deny due process because a judge would rule consistently with
that announcement to avoid problems with getting re-elected could just as
easily be used to show the process of electing judges violates due process
since, hypothetically, a judge could rule a certain way in a case simply to
get re-elected 2 Also, the argument that judicial elections are different
from non-judicial elections, while containing some truth, does not have as
much weight since judges have "the power to 'make' common law" and to
"shape the States' constitutions as well. 253 Finally, just because the
practice of prohibiting discussion of disputed legal and political issues has
existed for some time, this does not justify violating the First
Amendment.25 4 Besides, such a prohibition was neither unanimous nor
longstanding since the first Code regulating judicial campaign speech was
presented in the 1924 ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics and subsequent
Model Codes were not quickly or universally adopted.255 Therefore, not
only did the "announce" clause fail to establish a compelling interest that
was narrowly tailored, but even secondary interests could not justify
restricting judicial candidates First Amendment rights.
While the majority opinion did not expressly state that no restrictions
on judicial campaign speech would satisfy strict scrutiny, it clearly
expressed distaste for judicial elections in general. 6 This aversion to
judicial elections whether justified or not leaves states wondering if there is

248.
Id. at 780.
249.
Id.
250.
Id. at 781 (citing Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489
U.S. 214, at 222-23 (1989)).
251.
White, 536 U.S. at 782.
252.
Id. at 782-83.
253.
Id. at 784.
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Id. at 785-86.
255.
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Id. at 787-88 (stating that the ABA's opposition of judicial elections was "well
taken" and that such opposition "had the support of the Founders of the Federal
Government.").
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any hope for regulating judicial campaign speech so as to preserve the
impartiality and integrity of the judiciary.
2.

Concurring Opinions

Justices O'Connor and Kennedy both authored concurring opinions.257
Unlike the majority, Justice O'Connor was very clear in her aversion to
judicial elections 25 8 (which could stem from the fact that she is the only
Justice who ran for a judgeship).25 9 O'Connor felt that elected judges
would have, or at least could be perceived as having, a personal stake in the
outcome of highly publicized cases. 260 Also, since judicial campaigns can
be very expensive, candidates have to engage in fundraising, which may
once again either leave a judge feeling indebted to certain parties or create
the impression that a judge is indebted to a party. 261 Therefore judicial
elections, whether subject to judicial campaign speech restrictions or not,
created the appearance of a beholden judiciary. Minnesota could have
chosen an appointive system or a merit plan to select its judges, and since it
did not, any problem that the state had with judicial impartiality was
"largely one the State brought upon itself by continuing the practice of
popularly elected judges. 262
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion was the antithesis of Justice
O'Connor's opinion in that he expressly stated that "we should refrain from
criticism of the State's choice to use open elections .... States are free to
choose this mechanism ....
By condemning judicial elections across the
board, we implicitly condemn countless elected state judges and without
warrant., 26 3
Instead of condemning the system, Justice Kennedy
condemned any content-based speech restriction that did not fall within a
recognized exception. 26
While Justice Kennedy recognized judicial
integrity as a "state interest of the highest order," he adamantly condemned

257.
White, 536 U.S. 765.
258.
Id. at 788 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that "even aside from what
judicial candidates may say while campaigning, the very practice of electing judges
undermines this interest").
259.
In 1974, O'Connor ran successfully for election as a judge on the Maricopa
County Superior Court. Sandra Day O'Connor, DISCovering U.S. History on GaleNet,
Thomson Gale at http://www.galegroup.comfreeresources/whm/bio/oconnor-s.htm. (last
visited Feb. 10, 2004).
260.
White, 536 U.S. at 788-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Id. at 790.
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Id. at 792.
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Id. at 795-96.
264.
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any abridgment of the candidate's speech stating "[d]eciding the relevance
of candidate speech is the right of the voters, not the State., 265 Clearly,
Justice Kennedy would never approve of any judicial campaign speech
restrictions.
3.

Dissenting Opinions

The four dissenters, Justices John Paul Stevens, David Souter, Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer, all joined the two dissenting opinions
authored by Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg respectively.26 6 Justice
Stevens, who wrote to re-emphasize Justice Ginsburg's points, was most
troubled by both the majority's failure to distinguish judicial campaigns
from other campaigns, and its failure to recognize the difference between
campaign and pre-campaign speech.26 7 Justice Stevens rebuked the
majority for downplaying the significance of judicial independence and
impartiality and for assuming judicial candidates had the same free speech
rights as other candidates.268 First, Justice Stevens argued, judges are
fundamentally different than other public officials; while the legislature and
executive create laws and decide policy issues subject to the will of the
people, judges decide issues of law or fact which "should not be
determined by popular vote; it is the business of judges to be indifferent to
unpopularity." 269 Whether elected or appointed, a judge has a duty to serve
the Constitution, not a constituency, and must follow precedent, not
personal views.27 ° While a judge may make common law, he or she does
so based on the merits of the case, not the will of the people.27'
Not only are judicial candidates fundamentally different from other
candidates, but campaign speech was fundamentally different from precampaign speech.272 Expressing a view in an opinion or scholarly work
before becoming a candidate indicates a "thinking" lawyer or judge, but
expressing opinions during a campaign would, "shed little, if any light on
[the candidate's] capacity for judicial service" and "to the extent that such
statements seek to enhance the popularity of the candidate by indicating
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how he would rule in273specific cases if elected, they evidence a lack of
fitness for the office.,
Not only did Justice Stevens disagree with the majority's premises,
but he also took issue with the Court's interpretations of "impartiality. 27 4
Whether impartiality was defined as "lack of bias for or against either party
to the proceeding" or as "open-mindedness," the "announce" clause
contained a compelling interest in the restriction and was narrowly tailored.
If the impartiality meant preventing bias or the appearance of bias against a
party, that would be a compelling interest since bias could jeopardize the
integrity of the judiciary, and the "announce" clause would prohibit such
statements. 275 If impartiality meant open-mindedness, the "announce"
clause would be narrowly tailored because statements made prior to the
campaign do not commit a candidate to a position to the same degree a
statement made during a campaign would.276 No matter how "impartiality"
was defined, "electioneering that emphasizes the candidate's personal
predilections rather than his qualifications for judicial office" undermines
the judiciary.277
In her dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg further expounded on the
crucial differences between judicial candidates and other political
candidates. First, Justice Ginsburg disagreed with the "unilocular 'an
election is an election' approach," citing how dissimilar legislative and
executive officials were from judges who "do not sit as representatives of
particular persons, communities, or parties; they serve no faction or
constituency. 278 It was this difference that allowed States to "limit judicial
campaign speech by measures impermissible in elections for political
office., 2 79 Unlike the majority, Justice Ginsburg did not see any tension
between electing judges and restricting speech.28 ° Whatever the selection
method, speech restrictions were appropriate because the criteria for
choosing judges remained the same. 281 In footnote one, Justice Ginsburg
pointed out that "every Member of this Court declined to furnish such
information to the Senate, and presumably to the President as well,"
proving that those selecting the judges, whether they be senators or the
electorate, have no need for the information that the "announce" clause
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proscribed.282 Therefore, restrictions on judicial candidates' speech should
have been allowed.
Justice Ginsburg also chastised the Court for distorting the lower
courts' and Minnesota Supreme Court's construction of the "announce"
clause.283 Under the narrowed construction, a wide range of highly
informative comments could be made, but statements that committed the
candidate to a specific position on an issue could not.284 Furthermore, it
was improper to accept the respondent's attorney's interpretation of the
clause during oral arguments instead of the interpretation the previous
courts employed.285 Therefore, the "announce" clause prohibited less
speech than the Court described.
Finally, Justice Ginsburg discussed what the majority avoided, the
interaction between the "announce" clause and the "pledges or promises"
clause.286 All parties to the proceeding agreed that the "pledges or
promises" clause was constitutional as it protected litigant's rights to an
287
"impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases."
Citing past U.S. Supreme Court cases, Justice Ginsburg relayed three
principles, that a litigant is deprived of due process if a judge has an
interest in ruling against him, the interest can stem from a desire to be
retained in office, and actual bias is not necessary if there is a probability of
unfairness.2 88 Using these principles, Justice Ginsburg demonstrated how
the "pledges or promises" clause was amply supported since it supported
"'maintaining a judiciary fully capable of performing' its appointed task"
and "preserving the public's confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
its judiciary. 289 Without the "announce" clause, though, the "pledges or
promises" clause "would be feeble, an arid form, a matter of no real
importance. 2 9 ° Without the "announce" clause, a candidate could
circumvent the "pledges or promises" clause by implying a position, but
not use the word "pledge" or "promise. ' ' 291 The effect would be the same
whether announcing "this is my view" or pledging "this is what I will do."

282.
Id.
283.
Id. at 809.
284.
White, 536 U.S. at 809-10 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
285.
Id. at 810.
286.
Id. at 813.
287.
Id. (quoting Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980)).
288.
Id. at 815 (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); Ward v. Monroeville,
409 U.S. 57 (1972); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986); In re Murchison,
349 U.S. 133 (1955)).
289.
Id. at 817.
290.
White, 536 U.S. at 819.
291.
Id.
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Without the "announce" clause, the "pledges or promises" clause did little
to "maintain the health of [Minnesota's] judiciary. 29 2
Both Justice Stevens' and Justice Ginsburg's opinions placed the
importance of the judiciary above the First Amendment rights of the
candidates realizing that those First Amendment rights would mean very
little if there were no judiciary to uphold them. By recognizing the
important differences between judicial and non-judicial elections and
campaign and pre-campaign speech, and by understanding the
interdependence of the "announce" clause and "pledges or promises"
clause, the dissenting opinions illustrated the constitutionality of and
absolute need for judicial campaign speech restrictions. But, since five
Justices did not agree, the states are left wondering how can they follow the
will of the people who want to maintain an elected judiciary and still
preserve the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
E.

THE ANALYSIS

All that appears certain from this decision is that the "announce"
clause is not constitutional. Whether the "pledges or promises" clause, the
"commit" clause from the 1990 ABA Model Code, or any judicial
campaign speech restriction would withstand strict scrutiny, is uncertain
after White. While Justice Scalia claimed to express no view on the
constitutionality of the "pledge or promises" clause,293 the opinion seemed
to touch it nevertheless by implication. Furthermore, Justice Scalia
attempted to exclude the "commit" clause from the analysis by refusing, in
footnote five, to evaluate "whether the announce clause (as interpreted by
state authorities) and the 1990 ABA canon are one and the same" since
"[n]o aspect of our constitutional analysis turns on this question. 2 94 These
two statements, which seem designed to eliminate the "pledges or
promises" and "commit" clauses from this analysis, instead created more
confusion by leaving the states wondering what the implication of the
opinion is. Is only the "announce" clause unconstitutional and the "pledges
or promises" and "commit" clause constitutional? Will any judicial
campaign speech restriction be deemed unconstitutional, now?
Unfortunately, there are no clear answers.
The first problem comes from Justice Scalia's interpretation of the
"announce" clause. Instead of accepting a district court, appellate court,

292.
293.
294.

Id. at 820-21.
Id. at 770.
Id. at 774.
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and Minnesota Supreme Court's narrowing interpretation of the
"announce" clause, Justice Scalia recognized the respondent's attorney, Mr.

Gilbert's, interpretation in the midst of oral arguments. Whether Mr.
Gilbert's interpretation was or was not a correct interpretation should have
been more closely examined especially in light of In re Code of Judicial
Conduct in which the Minnesota Supreme Court expressly adopted the
federal courts' narrow interpretation of the "announce" clause.295 Even if
upon close examination, Mr. Gilbert's interpretation was correct, it does
not appear as problematic as Justice Scalia claimed. If a candidate were to
announce that a previous case was wrongly decided and he or she did not
believe in stare decisis, that statement would not technically fall under the
"pledges or promises" clause, but the only possible reason for the statement
would be to indicate that if elected the candidate would overturn the prior
decision. Such an implication is completely contrary to the notion of an
unbiased judge. As for Justice Scalia's problem with not being able to give
examples of a judge's judicial philosophy, once again, an example would at
least be implying a promise to decide a case a certain way. Just because a
candidate could not exemplify his or her judicial philosophy does not
preclude an explanation of the philosophy. It appears that Justice Scalia
feels that the electorate could not understand an explanation without an
example, but perhaps the public should be given more credit.
Not only did the majority opinion fail to construe the "announce"
clause as the highest court of the state deemed appropriate, but it also failed
to address a major issue when it ignored whether a narrow "announce"
clause is the same as the "commit" clause. This issue should have been
discussed in light of the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision to essentially
construe the "announce" clause as meaning the same thing as the "commit"
clause. By failing to address this issue, the court's decision brings
absolutely nothing new to the area of campaign speech restrictions. In the
pre-White cases discussed above, every court agreed that the "announce"
clause by itself violated the First Amendment. The controversy came when
the courts decided whether to narrowly construe it and whether that could
save the restriction from being unconstitutional. Instead of addressing the
live controversy, the Court created more controversy.
The major controversy sparked by this opinion occurs when Justice
Scalia goes through his definitions of "impartiality." This exercise in
semantics leaves the states wondering what, if any, interest would be
considered compelling. While it seemed clear that neither "impartiality" in
the sense of "lack of bias for or against a party to a proceeding" or in the

295.

639 N.W.2d 55 (Minn. 2002).
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sense of "lack of preconception in favor or against a particular legal view"
would establish a compelling state interest in Justice Scalia's mind, he was
too vague in his discussion of "impartiality" in the sense of "openmindedness" to establish whether that could be a compelling state
interest. 296 Open-mindedness is apparently "desirable," but that does not
mean it is compelling.297
Doubt as to whether any judicial campaign speech restrictions would
be constitutional only deepens as the majority opinion discusses the underinclusiveness of the "announce" clause. Under Justice Scalia's reasoning,
what is the point in having a "pledge or promises" or a "commit" clause
since up to the date of the candidate entering the race, the candidate can say
or do anything. Why prohibit a judge from pledging to overturn Roe v.
Wade if it is already clear from previous legal writings or from his or her
membership in the local Right To Life group that such a result is what the
candidate intends? The only spark of promise for judicial campaign speech
restrictions is that Justice Scalia acknowledges that "perhaps" an elected
judge could be reluctant to contradict a campaign promise and the "pledges
or promises" clause would cover that situation, but his quick qualifier that
the "pledges or promises" clause "is not challenged here" allows the
uncertainty to creep back in.298 Furthermore, the majority could not resist
pointing out that restricting speech in the context of an election "sets our
First Amendment jurisprudence on its head" implying a discontentment
with any judicial campaign speech restrictions.2
Perhaps the most disheartening signal from the majority opinion for
judicial campaign speech restrictions was the implication that such
restrictions' real purpose was to "undermine" judicial elections. 300 After
stating that judicial elections were not that different from legislative
elections,3 ° ' the majority opinion attempted to reaffirm the implication that
judicial campaign speech restrictions were designed to undermine elections
by stating that "since the ABA, which originated the announce clause, has
long been an opponent of judicial elections" the disparity between the
public's desire to elect judges and the Court's restrictions on candidate
speech, which are based on ABA models, is unsurprising.3 °2 If the
"announce" clause's purpose is perceived to be to undermine judicial
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297.
298.
299.
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301.
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White, 536 U.S. at 774-78.
Id. at 778.
id. at 780.
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White, 536 U.S. at 787.
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elections even though the stated purpose is preserving the impartiality and
integrity of the judiciary, using the stated purpose for the other restrictions
seems to have less force.
The concurring opinions leave little, if any, hope for any judicial
campaign speech restrictions. Justice O'Connor has such a distrust of
judicial elections that her "you-brought-this-upon-yourselves" attitude
suggests she has no sympathy for any attempts to make the elective system
better, but would prefer to see it fall. It is likely, however, that she would
support restrictions on a judicial nominee's speech since during her own
confirmation hearings she refused to state her position on certain issues
stating:
I do not believe that as a nominee I can tell you how I
might vote on a particular issue which may come before
the Court, or endorse or criticize specific Supreme Court
decisions presenting issues which may well come before
the Court again. To do so would mean that I have
prejudged the matter or have morally committed myself to
a certain position. Such a statement by me as to how I
might resolve a particular issue or what I might do in a
future Court action might make it necessary for me to
disqualify myself on the matter. This would result in my
inability to do my sworn duty; namely, to decide cases that
come before the Court.303
Justice O'Connor also leaves out any discussion of the problems with
appointive or merit systems.
While the electoral system for judges is not
a perfect system, it is unfair to suggest that alternative systems are perfect.
Also, it is unclear as to why Justice O'Connor's judgment as to the best
selection method should replace the judgment of the people of the state. In
the 2000 election, Floridians had the option of switching to a merit system
for their appellate judges, and overwhelmingly declined to do so, as did

303.
Randall T. Shepard, Telephone Justice, Panderingand Judges Who Speak Out
of School, 29 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 811, 813-14 (2002) (quoting Nomination of Sandra Day
O'Connor: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on the Judiciaryon the Nomination of Judge
Sandra Day O'Connorof Arizona to Serve as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of

the United States, 97th Cong. 57-58(198 1)).
304.
See Dr. David Neubauer, Issues in Judicial Selection, 49 LA. B.J. 450 (2002)
(stating that the difference between an elective system and a merit selection system is that
political leaders are able to manipulate in the first, but members of the bar do the
manipulation in the second).
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Ohioans in 1987.305 Therefore, it seems that while Justice O'Connor would
do away with judicial elections, a majority of the states disagreed with her,
and perhaps their opinions should be considered.
There appears to be no hope of convincing Justice Kennedy to accept
any judicial candidate-speech restrictions as constitutional.
Justice
Kennedy clearly recognized a compelling state interest, but felt it was not
enough to justify abridging a candidate's First Amendment rights. His
opinion adamantly and clearly opposed any speech restriction and his
clarity, at least, should be commended.
It seems that while the liberals were once the defenders of the First
Amendment, the conservatives have usurped the cause of protecting free
speech, so that ideology is no longer an accurate predictor of how the Court
will decide a First Amendment case. 30 6 This causes more uncertainty as to
whether any judicial candidate speech restrictions will be upheld. It seems
that with Justices O'Connor and Kennedy persistently opposed to speech
restrictions, Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer could have
trouble mustering a majority should another judicial campaign speech
restriction cross the Supreme Court's path. But, Justices Stevens' and
Ginsburg's opinions were both very persuasive and, perhaps, could gather a
majority if the "pledge or promises" and "commit" clauses come before the
Court.
Even if the differences between judicial campaigns and other political
campaigns could be ignored, and even if the under-inclusiveness of
restricting only campaign speech is maintained, it would be hard to ignore
Justice Ginsburg's analysis of how at least the "pledges or promises"
restrictions maintain the due process rights of litigants. 307 After all, the
Constitution protects litigants' Due Process rights as surely as it protects
candidates' First Amendment rights. When these two constitutionally
protected rights conflict, would it not seem the fairest solution for the
judicial candidates' First Amendment rights to defer to the litigant's Due
Process rights? If litigants no longer have due process, then the very
principle on which the judiciary is based would disappear and the need for
judicial candidates would be inconsequential. The judiciary is undoubtedly
unlike the other political branches, and as long as states elect their judges,

305.

Roy A. Schotland, Should Judges Be More Like Politicians?,39 CT. REV. J. OF

THE AM. JUDGES Ass'N, Spring 2002 at 8, 9 (referring to Roy A. Shotland, Financing
Judicial Elections, 2000: Change and Challenge, 2001 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 849, 886-
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the problem of judicial campaign speech is one with which the states must
wrestle in order to preserve their judiciaries' integrity and impartiality.
V.

REACTIONS TO THE WHITE DECISION

Within a day of the publication of the opinion, reactions from legal
scholar and experts in the field of judicial ethics abounded. The president
of the ABA, Robert E. Hirshon, called the decision a "bad decision [that]
will open a Pandora's box. 3 °8 Professor Steven Lubet of Northwestern
University School of Law said of the decision, "it's bad, bad, bad because
justices aren't alderman. You expect politicians to make promises, but
judges should not make promises." 3°9 The director of the Center for
Judicial Ethics at the American Judicature Society, Cynthia Gray, stated
about the decision, "judges are supposed to decide the facts of a particular
case, without thinking about what was promised during the campaign and
how this will look in the press ....

Integrity is important in all elected

offices, but it is particularly important in judicial offices. 31 ° Some feared
that the decision left canons like the ABA's 1990 Model Code "commit"
clause "susceptible to attack using the same logic that the high court
employed in striking down the announce clause., 31 1 According to Deborah
Goldberg of the Brennan Center for Justice in New York, the decision "will
open the door to candidates who want to use their campaign speech to
solicit donors and wealthy special interest, who are increasingly becoming
involved in judicial campaigns" and "has an unfortunate effect on the
ability of our courts to remain fair and impartial. 31 2
Of course, there were reactions on the other end of the spectrum from
those like Steven Shapiro, the director of the American Civil Liberties
Union who called the ruling, "the correct decision" and felt it only opened
"a slightly wider scope of debate in judicial elections around the
country. 313 The United States Chamber of Commerce called the decisions
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David G. Savage, Running Stance, Judicial Candidates Now Free to Sound Off
on Election Issues, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2002, at 32.
309.
Jan Crawford Greenburg & John McCormick, Justices: States Can't Block
Judge Hopefuls' Speech, CHI. TRIB., Jun. 28, 2002.
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a "major First Amendment victory that would result in the public learning
more about the views of those seeking judicial office. 3 14 All the
immediate reactions were similar in that there seemed to be no middle
ground, scholars were either touting the "good news" or predicting doom
and gloom.
Ensuing months saw legal scholars trying to predict whether
remaining judicial campaign speech restrictions would withstand strict
Some of the states' supreme courts and disciplinary
scrutiny.315
committees also responded.
A.

OFFICIAL STATE RESPONSES

On July 18, the Supreme Court of Missouri issued an order that
declared that Missouri's Rule 2.03 which stated, "A candidate, including an
incumbent judge, for judicial office shall not announce views on disputed
legal issues" would not be enforced, but their "pledges or promises" and
"misrepresent" clauses would remain in full force and effect.3 16 The court
added, though that "Recusal or other remedial action, may nonetheless be
required of any judge in cases that involve an issue about which the judge
has announced his or her views
as otherwise may be appropriate under the
317
Code of Judicial Conduct.,
The Supreme Court of Texas amended Texas' Code of Judicial
Conduct in light of the White decision. 318 Added to its Canon 3(B)(10)
language which required a judge from abstaining from "public comment
about a pending or impending proceeding which may come before the
judge's court in a manner which suggests to a reasonable person the
judge's probable decision on any particular case" was the phrase "[tihis
prohibition applies to any candidate for judicial office, with respect to
judicial proceedings pending or impending in the court on which the

314.
Linda Greenhouse, Justices Strike Down Minnesota Law Prohibiting Political
Statements by JudicialCandidates, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 27, 2002.
315.
See Chermerinsky, supra note 306, at 81 (doubting whether a distinction
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Judges, Politics, and the FirstAmendment, 4 NO. 16 LAW. J., 4 (2002) (finding it difficult
to separate the "pledge or promises" clause from the "announce" clause); Michele Jochner,
Limiting the Limits on Judicial Campaign Speech, 90 ILL. B.J. 520 (Oct. 2002) (interpreting
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317.
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Approval of Amendments to the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct, No. 02-9167
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candidate would serve if elected.,
stating that a candidate,

319

The Court further deleted a provision

shall not make statements that indicate an opinion on any
issue that may be subject to judicial interpretation by the
office which is being sought or held, except that discussion
of an individual's judicial philosophy is appropriate if
conducted in a manner which does not suggest to a
reasonable
person a probable decision on any particular
3 20
case.

Language prohibiting "pledge or promises" regarding "judicial duties
other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office,
but may state a position regarding the conduct of administrative duties"
was replaced with language prohibiting "pledges or promises" regarding
"pending or impending cases, specific classes of cases, specific classes of
litigants, or specific propositions of law that would suggest to a reasonable
person that the judge is predisposed to a probable decision in cases within
the scope of the pledge. 3 2' Finally, candidates were prohibited from
3 22
making statements that would violate Canon 3B(10) as amended.
The Kentucky Judicial Conduct Commission decided not to amend
Supreme Court Rule 4.300, Canon 5(B)(1)(c) which is identical to the 1990
ABA Model Code, but did state in a memorandum to all justices, judges,
and judicial candidates that "[r]ecusal, or other remedial action, may
nonetheless be required of any judge in cases that involve an issue about
which the judge has announced his or her views as otherwise may be
appropriate under the Code of Judicial Conduct." 323 Likewise, the Florida
Supreme Court Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee issued a statement
which construed the White decision narrowly and as limiting only the
"announce" clause, so that Florida's "pledges or promises" clause would
not be touched by the decision. 24 The statement also referred to Florida

319.
Id.
320. Id.
321.
Id.
322.
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323.
A memorandum to justices, judges and judicial candidates from the Kentucky
Judicial Conduct Commission regarding the Republican Party of Minn. v. White was issued
on August 5, 2002 (source provided by the American Judicature Society, on file with
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324.
Statement of the Florida Supreme Court Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee
was issued on July 5, 2002 (source provided by the American Judicature Society, on file
with author).
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Supreme Court Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee Opinion 02-13 that
also affirmed Florida's "commit" clause. 25
The Louisiana Supreme Court decided not to change Louisiana's
Code of Judicial Conduct, which contained a "commit" clause instead of an
"announce" clause.326 Louisiana recently created a judicial campaign
oversight committee, which cannot enforce the Code or discipline for
violations of the Code, but can issue public statements if two-thirds of its
members find a violation. 327 Louisiana's judicial campaign oversight
committee asks judicial candidates to voluntarily sign a "campaign conduct
pledge" 8 and can divulge who did or did not sign the pledge if requested to
32
do SO.
The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the
Ohio Supreme Court issued an advisory opinion outlining eleven guidelines
to help judicial candidates determine whether their campaign speech would
be appropriate.32 9 Ohio did not have an "announce" clause and decided not
to disturb the "pledges or promises," "commit," and "misrepresent" clauses
in Ohio's Code. The eleven guidelines further expounded on Ohio's
current Code.
Finally, Georgia's immediate response by its Judicial Qualifications
Commission was to issue a statement that the White case did not effect the
Georgia Judicial Canon because the "announce" clause was eliminated
from the Canon in 1998.330 At this time, though, the District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia in Weaver v. Bonner had recently found
Georgia's Canon 7B(l)(d), which is similar to a "misrepresent" clause,
overbroad, and the appeal was pending in the Eleventh Circuit. 33' The
Eleventh Circuit cited White as it not only struck down Georgia's version
of the "misrepresent" clause, but also as it struck down Georgia's
prohibitions on judicial candidates personally soliciting campaign
contributions.3 32
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B.

WEAVER V. BONNER

1.

The Facts

In 1998, George M. Weaver ran against incumbent Justice Leah J.
Sears for a seat on Georgia's Supreme Court. 333 During his campaign,
Weaver, after an unsuccessful attempt at having it reviewed by the special
committee in charge of finding violations of Georgia's Judicial Code of
Conduct, distributed brochures which said of his opponent:
(1) She would require the State to license same-sex
marriages
(2) She has referred to traditional moral standards as
pathetic and disgraceful
(3) Justice Sears has called the electric chair 'silly' (the
words 'THE DEATH PENALTY' were in an adjacent
column).334

When the committee received complaints about the brochure, it
determined the above three sentences violated Canon 7B(l)(d) which stated
judicial candidates:
Shall not use or participate in the use of any form of public
communication which the candidate knows or reasonably
should know is false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, or
contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law or
omits a fact necessary to make the communication
considered as a whole not materially misleading or which
expectation about the
is likely to create an unjustified
335
results the candidate can achieve.
The committee issued a confidential cease-and-desist request with
which Weaver agreed to comply. 336 But shortly thereafter, Weaver aired a
television ad, which stated:

333.
334.
335.
336.
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Id. at 1340.
Id. at 1339.
Id. at 1340.
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(1) What does Justice Leah Sears stand for? Same sex
marriage. (The graphic Same Sex Marriage appeared.)
(2) She's questioned the constitutionality of laws
prohibiting sex with children under fourteen. (The graphic
Questioned Laws Protecting Our Children appeared.)
(3) And she has called the electric chair silly.
(The
337
graphic Called the Electric Chair Silly appeared.)
The committee found this ad violated its cease-and-desist request and
issued a public statement that Weaver violated that request and the
television ad was "unethical, unfair, false, and intentionally deceptive" and
"nothing short of an intentional and blatant violation of candidate Weaver's
previous written assurance of his intent to comply with the Committee's
original cease-and-desist request. 33 8 Weaver then filed suit contending his
free speech and due process rights were violated. 339 The committee sent its
files on Weaver to the Georgia State Bar so that the Bar could determine
any appropriate sanctions.
2.

The District Court

The District Court determined that Canon 7B(1)(d) was overbroad.34 °
Finding the speech to be "political expression regarding the qualifications
of candidates for public office," the Court applied strict scrutiny. 34' The
Court recognized a compelling state interest in preserving the integrity and
independence of the judiciary, but held the restriction was not narrowly
tailored.34 2 Because Canon 7B(l)(d) prohibits more than just false
statements knowingly made, it "fails to provide the necessary 'breathing
space' to survive First Amendment scrutiny. 34 3 The Canon "chilled"
debate and impeded "the public's ability to influence the direction of the
courts through the electoral process."' 344 The Court further refused to rewrite the Canon so as to make it constitutional because the Court felt it was
not "readily susceptible to a narrowing construction" as language would

337.
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339.
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341.
342.
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have to be both added and taken away to save it. 345 While the Court
determined 7B(1)(d) to be overbroad, it declined to do the same for
Canon7B(2) which prohibited judicial candidates from personally soliciting
campaign contributions.346
3.

The Eleventh Circuit

The Eleventh Circuit not only agreed that 7B(1)(d) was overbroad, but
it also held 7B(2) was unconstitutional.3 47 First, in dealing with 7B(l)(d),
the court, applying strict scrutiny, claimed to accept that Georgia had a
compelling interest, but found the Canon was not narrowly tailored because
it prohibited "false statements negligently made and true statements that are
misleading or deceptive., 348 Since misstatements in debate are inevitable,
the State cannot punish them, for to do so would "chill" any debate and
therefore violate the First Amendment. 349 The only way a "misrepresent"
clause could be narrowly tailored would be if it applied the "actual malice"
standard that limited only false statements "made with the knowledge of
falsity or with reckless disregard as to whether the statement is false. 35 °
The reason the court felt an actual malice standard must apply was
that it did not believe there was a distinction between judicial elections and
other political elections. 35' First, the court regurgitates Justice O'Connor's
sentiment in White that the problem was with electing judges not with what
may be said while campaigning.3 52 The court then interprets White as
standing for the proposition that "the standard for judicial elections should
be the same as the standard for legislative and executive elections. 353 By
quoting Justice Scalia's feeling that any difference between judicial and
other elections has been "greatly exaggerated, ' 354 the court decided that
judicial elections must be treated the same as any other elections.355 The
ramification of this interpretation would be, of course, that no judicial
campaign speech restriction could be upheld. If judicial elections were
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truly no different that other elections, then precedent concerning free
speech in the context of political campaigns would control, and, as has
"occupies the core of the protection afforded
been mentioned, such speech
356
by the First Amendment. ,
This view of the White decision meant that Canon 7B(2), which
"prohibits judicial candidates from personally soliciting publicly stated
support," also failed strict scrutiny as candidates are "completely chilled
from speaking to potential contributors and endorsers about their potential
contributions and endorsements. 35 7 The court felt that since judicial
candidates necessarily had to raise money to wage a successful campaign,
elected judges would therefore be partial, and requiring a "candidate's
agent" to seek the contribution instead of the candidate him or herself did
not greatly reduce the risk of partiality.35 8 The court cynically observed
that "[s]uccessful candidates will feel beholden to the people who helped
them get elected regardless of who did the soliciting of support. 359
Weaver v. Bonner represents what past ABA president, Robert
Hirshon, and others feared when calling the White decision a "bad"
decision. The White decision was ambiguous enough for courts to use it to
With the
strike down campaign speech restrictions with impunity.
existence of campaign speech restrictions being so precarious, those
concerned with preserving the judiciaries' integrity may have to look to
other alternatives.

VI.

ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE-THE UNOFFICIAL CAMPAIGN CONDUCT
COMMITTEE

If restrictions on judicial campaign speech are unavailable, a possible
solution may be the unofficial campaign conduct committee. At A
National Symposium on Judicial Campaign Conduct and the First
Amendment on November ninth through tenth of 2001, the problem of
judicial campaign speech was discussed and recommendations on how to
One
preserve the integrity of the judiciary were offered.3 6

356.
(1995)).
357.
358.
359.

Id. at 1319 (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 346

Id. at 1322.

Id.
Weaver /, 309 F.3d at 1323.

360.
The Way Forward: Lessons from the National Symposium on Judicial
"The
Campaign Conduct and the First Amendment, 35 IND. L. REV. 649 (2002).

Symposium was organized by the National Center for State Courts, funded by the Joyce
Foundation and Open Society Institute, and chaired by Indiana Chief Justice Randall
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recommendation was the formation of official and unofficial campaign
conduct processes, for example the campaign conduct committee. 36' Like
the committee Louisiana formed as discussed above, the campaign conduct
committee is an alternative approach to keeping judicial candidate's speech
(and perhaps more) in check. The basic purposes of campaign conduct
committees are to "serve as a resource for judges and judicial candidates,
assist in educating judges and judicial candidates about ethical campaign
conduct and help deter unethical judicial campaign activities. ,,362 This can
be accomplished by conducting educational seminars, issuing advisory
opinions, asking candidates to voluntarily sign statements agreeing to abide
by campaign speech restrictions, reprimanding publicly unethical conduct
by judicial candidates, and the like.
A committee can be composed of a variety of people including
lawyers or judges appointed by the state Supreme Court to concerned
citizens who volunteered.363 It does not matter who is on the committee as
long as the members are neutral, knowledgeable, and diverse enough to
look at issues and statements on allegations in an unbiased manner. While
committees would not have the ability to discipline judicial campaign
speech, the committees can attempt to counter the negative effects of
unethical speech with speech condemning the unethical practice. This
remedy would take full advantage of the First Amendment instead of
restrict it. There are two possible positive effects of remedial speech.
First, the public could vote against the candidate condemned by the
Committee or, second, judicial candidates may be more reluctant to engage
in unethical speech, if there is a perceived possibility that the respected
group's condemnation could hurt their chances in the election. A campaign
conduct committee could be a constitutionally permissible alternative to
speech restrictions.
While the campaign conduct committee looks like an "elegant
3 64
solution," there are possible problems that the committees could face.
First, in order for the committee's speech to have an effect, it must be

Shepard under the general direction of a steering committee consisting of Chief Justices
Shirley Abrahamson of Wisconsin, Norman Fletcher of Georgia, Thomas Moyer of Ohio,
Thomas Phillips of Texas, and Judge (and former Chief Justice) William Ray Price of the
Missouri Supreme Court." Id.
361.
Id. at 655.
362.
'Restraint' Urged After Rules Relaxed in Judicial Elections, The Advocate
Online, at http://www.theadvocate.com (July 7, 2002).
363.
Barbara Reed & Roy A. Schotland, Judicial Campaign Conduct Committees,
35 IND. L. REV. 781, 785-88 (2002).
364.
Steven Lubet, Judicial Campaign Conduct Committees: Some Reservations
About an Elegant Solution, 35 IND. L. REV. 807 (2002).
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designed to either impact an election or appear to impact an election and
interfering with an election can be problematic especially for "official"
committees as will be illustrated below. 365 If the speech from "unofficial"
committees is issued after thoughtful and unbiased deliberation, then it is
appropriate and should be considered by the electorate as they choose their
candidate.
A second problem with the committee, though, is establishing its
credibility. 366 Professor Steven Lubet argues it would be impossible to
assemble a group of people that everyone considered "diverse, respected,
knowledgeable, [or] neutral" and cited a recent Illinois election in which
the Chicago Bar Association (which, while not a campaign conduct
committee, Lubet argued was the same as one) publicly chastised a
candidate for some particularly contemptible attack ads.367 Some, of
course, criticized the Bar for this statement feeling that it lacked
objectivity.36 8 This example is not a very good one since the Chicago Bar
Association was not a campaign conduct committee, would likely have
been biased, and never made an attempt to be unbiased. The point,
however, is well taken. While the risk of looking partial will always face
campaign conduct committees, it is still possible to compose a neutral
committee accepted by most. If a committee is "nonpartisan (or panpartisan), multi-professional, and expansively inclusive" and composed of
"ordinary people," (defined by Lubet as civic activists, school teachers,
community organizers, and small business owners) such neutrality may be
achieved. 369 Professor Lubet believes, though, that this diversity could
result in an inability to reach a consensus, but that assumption may not be
correct, especially if the committee's goal is specifically defined.370 If a
committee goal is to chastise statements that would violate the 1990
"pledges or promises" and the narrower "commit" clause, then a true
violation of either of these provisions will most likely be recognizable to a
majority of the committee.
As discussed above, there are different types of committees, which
have different advantages. There are three types of committees; the official
committees, the quasi-official committees, and unofficial committees.3 7'

365.
Id. at 812.
366.
Id. at 813.
367.
Id. at 814-15.
368.
Id.
369.
Id. at 816.
370.
Lubet, supra note 364, at 816.
371.
Reed and Schotland, supra note 363, at 785-88. Florida, Ohio, Georgia, and
Nevada employ official committees; Alabama, Michigan, South Dakota, and Louisiana rely
on quasi-official committees; and unofficial committees exist in states such as North
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Official committees are established and adopted by the state Supreme
Court and have the authority to take official action. 37 2 Quasi-official
committees are appointed by the state Supreme Court or other official body
and could issue statements that might be construed as official state
action.373 Finally, unofficial committees are those formed by state bar
associations or other groups concerned with ethical judicial campaigns and
which, after full consideration, offer public statements concerning unethical
speech made by judicial candidates.374 An important distinction between
official/quasi-official committees and unofficial committees is that official
and quasi-official committees are "limited by requirements of the First
Amendment and due process" while unofficial action is free of these
constraints.375 The problem with official committees being constrained
constitutionally is best illustrated by the Eleventh Circuit's ruling in
Weaver v. Bonner.
Weaver v. Bonner not only addressed the constitutionality of certain
campaign speech restrictions, but it also addressed the constitutionality of
Ohio's use of a "Special Committee on Judicial Election Campaign
Intervention. 376 Ohio's "Special Committee" was to be made up of "the
senior member of each of the three categories of the [Judicial
Qualifications Commission]" with the Commission Director serving as an
ex-officio member.377 The purpose of the Committee was to "alleviate
unethical and unfair campaign practices in judicial elections. 37 8 The
Committee's authority included investigating complaints of violations of
Canon 7, issuing a confidential cease-and-desist request to the candidate
upon a finding of a violation, and releasing a public statement upon a
finding of a violation of the cease-and-desist request.379 Weaver challenged
the constitutionality of the Committee.
The District Court held that the Committee and its authority did not
violate the First Amendment, instead finding it offered the "constitutionally
preferred cure of more speech., 380 The Eleventh Circuit, however,
disagreed finding that the "cease-and-desist request is . . . an
unconstitutional prior restraint because it . . . prohibits future statements

Carolina, Ohio, California, and New York. Id.
372.
Id. at 781-86.
373.
Id. at 786-87.
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Id. at 787-88.
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377.
Id.
378.
Id.
379.
Id.
380.
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which, although possibly similar to prior statements, have not yet been
found to be false, misleading and deceptive. ' 381 Because the Ohio
Committee was developed by the state, it was official action and thus
susceptible to First Amendment attacks.
In light of the Weaver decision, it appears that the best course in
regulating judicial campaign speech would be using an "unofficial"
committee. Therefore, it will take a concerted effort of the state bar
associations or concerned citizen groups to organize neutral bodies that can
knowledgeably and impartially provide guidance to judicial candidates and
publicly reprimand those candidates acting unethically. While this is a
daunting task that will not be easily accomplished, it is both possible and
necessary. If the state is not free to regulate judicial campaign speech,
harm to the preservation of the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary
seems inevitable. It is in the public's best interest to preserve the judiciary,
and groups such as state bar associations should attempt such preservation
through campaign conduct committees.
VII. CONCLUSION

Judicial candidate speech is becoming increasingly contentious 382 and
the threat to the impartiality and integrity of the judiciary is real. After
examining relevant case law in the area, namely the White case, hope for
judicial campaign speech restrictions is fading. Without restrictions,
mudslinging and unethical promises, whether expressed or implied, will
likely increase in state judicial campaigns. Leaving such speech unchecked
threatens the integrity and the public's faith in the judiciary. Therefore, if
official state action is not possible, state bar associations and citizen groups
must organize to educate and encourage judicial candidates to conduct
ethical campaigns, and if necessary, inform the public when a candidate
acts unethically.
As long as states have elected judiciaries, there is always a chance that
a judicial candidate could say something unethical in order to secure more
votes. While this is usually the exception, since most judicial candidates
do act ethically, it is the exception that typically gets the most attention and
does the most damage. It is the responsibility of all concerned citizens to
condemn such behavior and send the message to judicial candidates that
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unethical speech will not be tolerated, for a judiciary without integrity and
impartiality will have no authority.
JULIE SCHUERING SCHUETZ

